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This set of contributions originates from two panels organized at the 14th
EASA biennial conference held at the University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy. The
original call for papers read:
The  dualism  of  the  informal/formal  sector  distinction  has  recently  been
replaced with a recognition that informality/formality are a duality necessarily
bound up with each other. This recognition is one of the key legacies of Keith
Hart’s original work (1973), which was subsequently neglected as the ideas were
made  workable  for  economic  management.  Bringing  informal  and  formal
together is increasingly common in both academic analysis and development
policy,  the  latter  particularly  as  policies  encouraging  the  formalization  of
informality. This panel will broaden the terms of this engagement, by including
papers that look at a range of different kinds of intersection between the formal
and  the  informal.  Governmental  formalization  is  only  one  way  in  which
informality can be formalized; corporations can also formalize informal sector
operators, by bringing them into their corporate governance as subcontractors
or salespeople; within supra-national institutions formality and informality are
negotiated and enforced in the form of non-legally binding (soft law) tools such
as treaties and conventions; NGOs, grassroots movements and civic associa-
tions often struggle to see their practices formalized and legally recognized.
This panel  will  examine a range of  the various ways in which formality and
informality  intersect  and  interact:  subordination,  toleration,  regularization,
eradication, exploitation and subversion, to mention only a few of the possible
scenarios  and  processes.  The  trajectories  taken  by  these  intersections  of
formality and informality will have a great influence on the economic futures
that emerge in a less Euro-centric global economy1.
1. Emerging economic futures: The intersections of informality and formality, panel convened by
Alan Smart and Filippo M. Zerilli at  Anthropological legacies and human futures, 14th EASA
biennial conference, Milan, 20-23 July 2016. A spin-off related panel entitled Ethnographic
explorations  of  formal-informal  linkages  in  contemporary  global  economy  and  politics,  was
convened by Antonio Maria Pusceddu and Jon Harald Sande Lie at the same conference.
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Before organizing a more conventional book-length project we have de-
cided  to  ask  the  panel  participants  to  explore  some  of  those  issues  by
condensing the main points of their papers into a 1,500 words commentary,
wondering what kind of theoretical implications and policy repercussions –
if  any – they might  suggest. As a  collection of  short  paper  this  forum is
actually  an  attempt  to  explore  how  we  might  productively  rethink
in/formality today. Rather than proposing a coherent conceptualization of
“informality” per se (as proposed for instance by Kambur 2009) we encourage
reflection  on  formalization  and informalization  as  two  interlinked  social
processes through which people, individuals and collectivities interact and
give  shape  to  specific  social  dynamics  in  a  variety  of  time  and  space
coordinates. Here we mainly draw from researches  on in/formalization in
several  ethnographic  settings, ranging from Chalkida, a  city  in Greece, to
colonial  Hong Kong, from Philippines, to  the  periphery  of  Bamako, Mali,
from Argentina to southern Italy, from the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta,
to  two  newly  admitted  EU  member-states  and  a  EU  candidate  country,
respectively Czech Republic, Romania, and Kosovo. In order to refer to and
navigate  across  different  social  processes,  scenarios  and  life  stories  we
suggest to adopt the term “in/formality” (and “in/formalization”) instead of
“informality”,  precisely  to  prevent  the  risk  of  considering  the  “informal
sector” as a distinct domain, separate from the formal economy. Rather than
seeing either as a distinct domain, we see it as a “modality” of practice, or an
idiom of interaction and discourse, invariably entangled with formality and
vice versa. Moreover, while the dialectics of  formality and informality are
usually observed as an integral part of the economic realm, we suggest that
we  should  broaden  this  conventional  framework,  in  part  by including
governmental processes and practices.  We cannot neglect the political and
legal dimension in which in/formality appears in its diverse local, national
and  international  configurations.  In  fact,  by  comparing  very  different
processes  and  settings  this  forum  explores  how  the  notion  of
in/formalization could produce a novel understanding of a variety of subjects
and social phenomena beyond the economic dimension, or not necessarily
pertaining to the market in the strict sense of the term.
Interestingly, despite its limitations the concept of “informality” itself is
now part of a global imaginary widespread well beyond academic, scholarly
circles  (Harris  2017).  Practices  and  ideas  described  as  “informal”  are
appropriated  and  adapted  by  many  institutions  and  local  actors  alike, as
Stamatis  Amarianakis’ paper  on  the  Grassroots  meanings  of  informality in
Greece shows. In the context of the current global financial crisis, people
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from Chalkidia refer to “informality” as an economic strategy with significant
political implications. Here, even if not collectively organized or discursively
articulated,  the  expansion of  informal  practices  could  not  be  simply
considered  a  response  to  the  crisis  but  can  be interpreted  as  acts  of
resistance facing austerity politics and against taxation, the latter perceived
as a  form of dispossession. A genuine interest  in local  understandings  of
informality is found also in  Lenka Brunclíková’s paper focusing on a non-
monetary zone project in Pilsen, Czech Republic, where both the organizers
and visitors of such avant-gardist social spaces strive to obtain legitimacy
and formal recognition for a number of exchange practices, alternatives to
capitalist market economy rules and dynamics. Interestingly, in Pilsen non-
monetary  zone formality  and informality  are conceptually  and practically
welded  together, as  suggested  by  the  practice  of  “gift” understood  as  an
“economy of debt” in which gratuity and obligation coexist rather than being
opposite  to  one  other.  That  it  is  appropriate  to  frame  formality  and
informality along a continuum is also part of what we learn from  Dolores
Koenig’s  perspective on housing development in the outskirts of Bamako,
Mali. Examining the bottom-up process of formalization of land tenure she
frames as “trans-formality”, Koenig’s  paper also signals the importance of
thinking the formalization of informality – and hypothetically its reversal –
as a conflictual space where interest groups and individual actors negotiate
the  process  at  stake  and  its  uneven  dynamics.  While  it  is  apparently
unquestionable  that  the creation of  building  lots  in  such “unruly  places”
(Smart  2001)  near  Bamako  will  be  progressively  formalized  under  the
pressure of powerful real estate market actors and city private developers, it
is unpredictable when and for how long a counter-hegemonic process led by
displaced farmers will find ways to resist land formalization. In the absence
of adequate amounts of affordable housing it is likely that people will find
new solutions by informalizing in other ways and contexts. Ambiguity and
conflict over in/formalization is well represented in the privatization process
of the vegetable city market in Baguio, Philippines. Lynne Milgram’s paper
provides a critical account of city development as a complex arena in which
actors  with  different  political  agendas  connect, oppose, interact, ally  etc.
moving across the formal/informal, legal/illegal divide. Vegetable retailers,
city  officials  and  supermarket  all  make  use  of  a  number  of  – apparently
contradictory – formal procedures and informal practices in order to gain or
preserve their ability to negotiate, impose, protect their respective economic
interest  and  political  power  across  in/formalization.  A  similar  point  is
suggested  by  the  Argentinian  ethnographic  material  presented  by  Sarah
Muir. Observing new currency regulations introduced in Argentina’s monetary
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system  in  recent  years  (2011-2016)  Muir  conceives  in/formality  as  a
performed  distinction,  or  in  her  own  terms  as  a  process  of  “fractal
recursivity”. The fluidity of the dollar/peso exchange is a product and at the
same time the producer of a number of economic practices that cross or shift
the line between formal and informal. Of course this is a line never drawn
once  and  for  ever,  but  constantly  made  and  remade  by  economic  and
discursive  social  practices.  Uneven  currency  regulations  such  as  those
observed by Muir contribute to our understanding of in/formalization as a
“recursive” process.  Current controversies over “crypto-currencies” such as
Bitcoin  and  Initial  Coin  Offerings  offer  other  examples  of  how  even  the
governmental  regulation  of  money  is  being  challenged  by  new  forms  of
economic organization and practice, in ways comparable to the account of
ride-sharing companies by Mechthild von Vacano.
Albeit in different ways the contributions of Antonio Maria Pusceddu and
Alan Smart both address the question of discretion by government officials, a
significant issue for understanding formal and informal intersections within
governments.  Drawing  on  fieldwork  within  the  local  administration  of  a
southern Italian city,  Antonio Pusceddu scrutinizes the informalization of
labour  analysing  how several  regulatory  frameworks  promoted by  a  post-
welfare  national  scheme  meet  in  actual  practice  with  social  workers’
expectations. It considers at the same time the dual and apparently opposite
processes of informalization (e.g. precarization of work through subcontracting
or the so-called “gig economy”) and formalization (labour stabilization and
its  promises,  but  also  the  pressures  on informal  businesses  through new
forms of regulation, such as the recent demonetisation and imposition of
Goods and Services Tax in India) that workers’ moral economy – their values,
desires and frustrations – emerges and articulates with local administrators
and their discretionary policies. Conversely, in order to explore how informal
practices affect formalization processes Alan Smart’s commentary penetrates
Hong  Kong  bureaucratic  apparatus,  notably  by  examining  the  role  of
government  officials  and  their  discretion  when  facing  diverse  kinds  of
extralegal acts. Archival material from colonial Hong Kong suggests the need
to discard the conventional idea equating government with formality on the
one  hand,  and  society  with  informality  on  the  other.  Recognizing  that
governments  operate  through  and  produce  informality  enlightens  our
understanding  of  in/formalization processes  and their  actual  dialectics  in
specific moments and places, and reminds us of how informal practices help
to  support  formal  procedures  when  they  are  burdened  with  rigid  and
impracticable procedures. Mechthild von Vacano’s analysis of the motorbike
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taxi industry in Jakarta and especially the introduction of the new  Go-Jek
rideshare smartphone application offers another intriguing opportunity to
expose the intricacies of in/formalization processes under the influence of
state and non-state regulators. In fact, the ethnographic account discussed
by von Vacano suggests reframing the state/non-state conceptual divide. Her
commentary  shows  that  among  both  we  find  great  internal  diversity,
processes  and  agents  that  question  their  dichotomization. In  addition  to
that,  increasing  salience  of  the  sharing  economy  directly  challenges  the
operational value of the “informal sector” concept. In the last contribution
Filippo M. Zerilli and Julie Trappe focus on in/formality within development
studies,  the  scholarly  field  where  the  notion  of  “informal  sector”  was
originally forged. Their paper examines legal development as a marketplace,
not  just  regulation  of a  market,  in  which  rule  of  law  capacity  building
programs are traded and shaped by in/formalization processes and practices
performed by  “locals”, and  “internationals” together. Ethnography among
both groups shows that assigning to the “global North” the role of provider
of legal rationality and formal procedures for countries of the “global South”,
presumably driven (or “affected”) by informal, traditional, and often corrupt
practices  is  a  persistent,  misleading  ideological  assumption  (cf.  Herzfeld
1992). An insider  view of  the  actual  functioning  of  the  legal  cooperation
industry  shows  rather  that  dialectics  and  tensions  between  formal  and
informal  practices  permeate  the  actual  implementation  of  the  projects
beyond  the  local/international  divide,  responding  to  global  logics  of
supranational  governance  irrespective  of  the  projects’  content  and  their
actual outcome.
Drawing on fresh insights elaborated while doing empirical, ethnographic
research this forum intends to theoretically contribute to an understanding
of  in/formality  as  social  processes,  highlighting  their  uneven  and  often
contradictory configurations. Addressing a variety of locations and subjects
across  several  contexts  and  countries,  and  focusing  on  the  intersections
between formality and informality, we argue to frame in/formality as a social
process  beyond  economics.  However,  instead  of  proposing  a  rigorous
theoretical framework or a typological understanding of hybrid in/formalities
(on which see  Mica  2016)  we  rather  consider  in/formalization a  space  of
practice  and  reflection  which  is  crucial  to  our  understanding  of  the
articulation of the economy, the state, the market, power, politics and the
law, and their current assemblages. We do hope that colleagues interested in
the field will  find this collection of short papers inspiring for many other
possible ways to consider in/formalization as a set of practices and processes
2017 A⎸ NUAC. VOL. 6, N° 2, DICEMBRE 2017: 45-50
50                                                  ALAN SMART, JOSEPHINE SMART, FILIPPO M. ZERILLI (EDS)
productive  for  engaging  with  contemporary  local  and  global  power
articulations  and  scenarios.  With  informal  modes  of  getting  things  done
being  ubiquitous,  as  every  new  scandal  in  places  of  power  reveals,
assumptions of informality as being local, parochial, marginal and southern
have to be rejected and replaced with new ways of  conceptualization the
inevitable  interpenetration  and  entanglement  of  the  social  modes  and
processes  of  formality  and  informality. Treating  our  political  economy as
thoroughly  infused  by  the  duality  of  in/formalization  should  offer  new
possibilities  of  transcending  the  distorting  dualisms  of  mainstream
characterizations of the world.
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Grassroots meanings of informality
Resistance, subsistence and survival in the Greek crisis context
Stamatis AMARIANAKIS
Universitat de Barcelona
ABSTRACT: Informality poses multiple facets and functions in the modern economic world. In
this article I employ a bottom up approach in order to understand what informality is and
does  according  to  my  informants,  understandings  and  explanations  within  the  greater
context of the Greek, economic crisis. 
In this article I employ a bottom up approach to understand informality
and informal economic activities. I argue that informality provides weapons
for  the  weak  (Scott  1985,  1976)  to  subsist,  survive  and  resist  powerful
structures  and  institutions.  Specially,  I  focus  on  my  informants’  under-
standings and explanations of their informal activities, namely the informal
production and consumption of goods and services which I analyze within
the wider context of the Greek economic crisis. I draw on selected ethno-
graphic observations from Chalkida, Greece, a mid-sized provincial city at
the  periphery  of  Athens, where  I  conducted  fieldwork  from May  2015  to
December 20161. 
People in Chalkida, as well as in other provincial cities, have direct access
to nature and to food production. Almost every household is a petty olive oil
producer or has access to olive oil  through kinship or social networks. In
times of  crisis, olive oil  production is highly valued, while many, in their
effort to supply their income seek to sell their surplus informally. Another
resource, to which many in Chalkida have unmediated, market-less access is
seafood. Many  own  amateur  fishing  licenses  and  small  boats  to  practice
fishing as a hobby. Nowadays, many amateur fishermen manage to make a
substantial income out of fishing. 
1. Research developed within the ERC Grassroots Economics Project (GRECO).
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The agricultural and fishing sector, not only can provide food, but also in-
formal jobs to the unemployed masses. Informal employers claim that they
provide employment while, on the contrary, the formal sector fails to do so.
Illegal fishing activities have been intensified, while coast guard officials who
are responsible to guard and regulate fishing and diving activities are eager
to be bribed, especially after the vast reduction of their salaries. Informally
produced seafood is not only channeled to households and individuals. Many
taverns  of  Chalkida  are  supplied  with  seafood by  amateur  fishermen and
through that way informal goods could be formalized. The same stands true
for the agricultural production, such as olive oil, raw vegetables, cheese, wine
and meat, while in many cases the tavern owner might be himself or his kin a
producer of the above products. 
When I asked people who are either producers or consumers of informal
goods and services, they mostly used similar patterns of reasoning to justify
their informal actions. They mentioned that such practices are necessary to
survive,  subsist  and  resist  the  imposed  impoverishment  of  the  masses
provoked  by  the  prolonged  austerity.  Informally  produced  goods  enable
people  to  maintain  and  reinforce  social  relationships,  in  other  words  to
socialize. Goods, such as fish, meat and wine provide an occasion for people
to gather and as they said, to be able to have fun. In addition, many have said
that cultivating the land or going fishing relieves their stress and makes them
feel productive by balancing feelings of self contempt. 
In contrast  to the big  urban centres, such as Athens and Thessaloniki,
smaller cities seems to maintain strong relationships with the country side
and therefore high levels of, let’s say, traditional “informality”. During the
first years of crisis, the movement without “intermediaries”2, which set up
informal food markets all over Greece, had gained lots of popularity in big
cities such as Athens and Thessaloniki, a method which we could define as
urban and contemporary informality. Rakopoulos (2014, 2015) who studied
the  movement  without  intermediaries  in  Thessaloniki,  has  shown  the
challenges  and  the  struggles  of  this  social  movement  to  construct  and
sustain  a  solidarity  network  in  order  to provide  a  fair  price  for  both the
consumer and the producer . This informal social movement required high
organizational  level  since  it  had  to  mobilize  and  coordinate  consumers,
2. Their aim was to replace intermediaries who bought cheap agricultural products and then
sold dear to the end customer making big profits. By bypassing that chain, they ensured a
better and fairer price both for the producer and the consumer, while this practice was en-
dowed with a strong sense of solidarity and resistance against the imposed impoverishment
(see Rakopoulos 2015). 
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volunteers and producers from all over Greece. However, that movement has
had little success in smaller cities such as Chalkida, mainly because most of
Chalkida’s inhabitants had already had access to food production through a
less organized network based on kinship and social relationships. That is why
hunger has not been a big issue in Chalkida or in any other provincial city in
Greece.
Interestingly, when people use the word “survival”, they usually refer to
social and economic survival rather than to biological survival. Surviving the
crisis in my informants’ conceptualization, has not had the mere positivistic
determination of covering one’s basic needs. In small provincial cities, where
almost everyone knows everyone, survival, per se, has a symbolic meaning.
When people speak about survival, they mean to be able to sustain their life’s
achievements, be it a house, a business or their social status. It seems that
these material assets that people struggle to save have a life of their own.
Yet,  the  most  popular  practice  of  informality,  inherent  to  the  formal
commercial  market, is  tax evasion, usually through the sale of  goods and
services without receipts. Entrepreneurs and consumers justify this practice
by making arguments about mutual help, support and personal interest and
develop a polemical attitude towards dominant structures and institutions as
well  as  large multinational  firms. The ones  that  buy products or  services
without receipts usually pay less while those who sell informally are able to
hide income and avoid taxation on two levels. Firstly, they avoid attributing
the  consumption tax  which part  of  it  they  use  to  access  the  market  and
sustain their businesses, and secondly, they hide income and present lower
annual budget so they have less overall taxation. 
Here, lies a strong sense of solidarity towards local ventures and people
versus faceless, large multinational firms which have been taking advantage
of the deregulated market to extract more profits. Preferring to consume in
local businesses has multiple benefits for the local society since it enables
the  local  economies  to  reproduce. Supporting  the  survival  of  small  local
businesses by tolerating and encouraging their tax evading methods is an act
of social solidarity, and as an informant has put it, petty informal economic
activities maintain the social cohesion. In his view, the worst effect crisis has
had in the Greece is that the Greek society had lost its social cohesion. 
In many instances, the formal sector is governed by austerity, complexity,
irrationality, injustice  and corruption makes many to go informal. People
speak about the poor  services  and provisioning the State offers  and they
complain about the constantly reducing pensions, salaries and benefits and
the forever increasing taxation. Money they have paid to the State does not
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return to them as  taxation has  seized to be an egalitarian, redistributive
model. Paying fees and taxes is seen as a mode of dispossession, so people
resist,  however,  they  have  not  collectively  articulated  and  expressed  a
political discourse about the covert and overt acts of their resistance. Unlike
more  organized  informal  activities, such as  the movement  without  inter-
mediaries  in  which  people  have  produced  collectively  their  political
discourse  about  their  practices,  often  is  endowed  with  solidarity  and
resistance (Rakopoulos 2015). 
Very often austerity and dictated authoritative models are considered as
death  politics, a  biopolitical  governance  (Foucault  1997)  at  the  EU  scale
which  is  exercised  through  economic  power  and  indebtedness.  Popular
discourses around crisis  include words and terminology such as economic
colonialization.  Many  express  the  view  of  an  ongoing  war:  «What  the
Germans  did  not  succeed  to  get  with  arms, they  do  it  now  through  the
economic crisis. They are buying us out!» is a very common statement with
which the majority of Greeks would agree. We see that resistance takes also
the form of a national, an imagined collective resistance; however it is not
collectively organized as such. This is a grassroots, non-organized, national
and therefore imagined resistance. In that grassroots logic, the Nation has
been separated from the State. The State and the government are regarded as
puppet mechanisms of foreign capital interests which make structures act on
their behalf (Bourdieu 2005). Consequently, resistance takes the form of a
political  consumerism  and  an  economic  nationalism  (Lekakis  2015),
informality  is  empowered  by  the  dominant,  formal  regime  which
incorporates large scale economic demands of big capital interests and fails
to serve the needs of ordinary people, the body of the nation. Combined with
the continuous revelations of corruption scandals and upper scale informal
practices, petty informal economic activities and petty capital accumulation
through informal means are justified further. 
Last  but  not  least,  informally  produced  goods  provide  the  means  for
various food gatherings and festivities which oppose and provide relief to the
widespread economic (and social) depression crisis has brought. In that light
this is another form of resistance, to have fun and enjoy even in harsh times,
while at the same time informality acts as a disalienative force both on the
social and the economic sphere. Actually, I have witnessed a counter stereotype
being expressed in response to the one that highlights the laziness and un-
thoughtfulness of the “Southerners” in general, and Greeks in particular, to
handle their economics. In several instances, people told me that austerity
consists of a cultural trait of the North, hence through my informants’ views,
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austerity is not simply an economic project, it is the cultural assimilation of
Southern Europe to the strict German standards which opens up a field of
cultural resistance as well3.
To conclude with, informality has always been a constitutive part of the
Greek society (and economy). A deep socioeconomic structure upon which a
certain economic habitus has been constructed. The case of Greece enables
to study informality as a widespread social attitude which almost everyone
practices it in one way or another. Finally, when ordinary people speak about
informality they use the word “black money” or “black market” and non-
taxed income or to use a Greek idiom sti zoula that means to do in secret. It
seems  that  in  the  definition  of  the  concept  of  informality  the  voices  of
people, those who engage in informal activities have been ignored and are
absent in the formation of the term.
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Formalizing the informal?
A non-monetary zone project in Pilsen, Czech Republic
Lenka BRUNCLÍKOVÁ
University of West Bohemia
ABSTRACT: This  paper  is  based  on  two years  of  research  taking  advantage  of  participant
observation and interviews with the organizers as well as visitors of the non-monetary zone
in the Pilsen region, Czech Republic. The research reveals that despite the effort to formalize
this informal activity, tension between formal and informal conceptualization seems to be
an obstruction. 
About 2 years ago my friend gave me a scarf and told «It is from a non-
monetary zone». I had no idea what a non-monetary zone was and I was sur-
prised that he was not able to explain it to me. All attempts to define the
non-monetary zone ended in other questions. Also, the describing of  this
project was not trivial. The use of conventional terms did not work well. The
problem of defining the project of a non-monetary zone lies in the tension
between formal and informal spheres. As I started to be more interested in a
non-monetary-zone project in Pilsen, where it is organized at least 4 times a
year, I tried to find out in what sense do formality and informality intersect
within this experiment and how can this fact influence successful running of
this project.
In fact, the idea of non-monetary zone is nothing new, there are many
similar projects running abroad, such as various free shops and free markets
(e.g. Really Really Free Market, Schenke etc.), sometimes labelled as give-
away shops, Kost-Nix Laden, free stores etc. The idea of free shop goes back
to 1960’s to Diggers, a counter-cultural group from San Francisco providing
free food, and organizing free music and art performances (Overview: Who
Were (Are) the Diggers? 2016). Free shops are usually considered as a method
of direct action in alternative scene and are mostly placed in squats and/or
alternative cultural centres. 
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Free  shops  and  non-monetary  zone  share  the  same  basic  principle,
namely providing things without the necessity to use money. Proclaiming
the slogan “Give and Take”, anyone can come and bring something they want
to get rid of or take anything without an obligation to reciprocate. Participants
of these projects are not usually motivated by financial need but rather by
anti-capitalist  conviction or/and care for the environment. These projects
aim to show that “one man’s trash can be another man’s treasure”. Although
there are usually no fixed rules except one (not to use money), it is also ex-
pected that participants do not take things so that they can be resold. 
However, the non-monetary zone tries to overcome the closeness of free-
shops through the absence of permanent space and welcome people outside
alternative scene, therefore it is organized entirely in a public space, e.g. in a
park, on a street or in cafes, restaurants and gardens. The absence of permanent
space influences a different time dimension, the non-monetary zone is orga-
nized only for one day and takes place 4-6 times a year. The interval is de-
pendent on free time of organizers as well as on whether they manage to find
a suitable place. The one-day non-monetary zone allows people to bring here
not only clothes, shoes, books, kitchen utensils, dishes and tools, but also
plants and food, herbs from their own gardens or gained by dumpster diving.
Furthermore, within the non-monetary zone, the emphasis is put on the inter-
action with other people. In this aspect, the project differs from free shops,
which often work as places where people give away or take things, but there
is  no emphasis  on personal meetings. The non-monetary zone is  a  place
where people meet, discuss, they can learn about the history of things and
can make new friendships.
Like many similar projects, the non-monetary zone in the Czech Republic
has its roots in anarchistic movement. After the Velvet Revolution in 1989,
the  Czech  environment  fostered  an  anarchist  movement  in  the  form  of
Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation. The activities were focused mostly on
organizing demonstrations, squatting and publishing activities. With the ad-
vent of  so-called alter–globalization movements attention was paid to an
idea of “think globally, act locally”. Despite some efforts, this idea was hardly
applied in practice until 2012 when Days of Action were organized by Anar-
chist Federation. During this event, the first non-monetary zone was orga-
nized on a street in Prague. One year later, in 2013, the first non-monetary
zone took place in Pilsen.
Organizers of the non-monetary zone in Pilsen were theoretically inspired
by this Prague experiment, where it was held only once, however, they had no
direct experience. This is probably the reason why the non-monetary zone in
Pilsen tends to be disassociated from anarchistic origin since this is not im-
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portant for them and it works as a stigma which makes it very difficult to at-
tract people outside the alternative scene. However, the successful expansion of
this  project  also means to cross the imaginary line between the informal
sphere and the formal one. 
Although  correct  definition  is  essential  for  successful  running  of  this
project, even after five years it is not clear how to talk about this experiment
and the activities that are practiced here. Some participants tried to define
the non-monetary zone during interviews, however, they changed their mind
later as it did not fit to practices within non-monetary zone. Most of them
mentioned terms like “absence of money”, “space for unwanted things”, “ab-
sence of hierarchy”, “exchange system”, “gift giving”, “autonomous space for
meeting”, and “sharing”. But it turned out that the vast majority of actors
when asking, «How would you describe this project to someone else?» were
surprised and did not know how to deal with it. 
Free shops and similar projects are sometimes called as a part of gift econ-
omy. Although anthropology has proven that the gift can take various forms,
this term as well as similar concepts describing the activities within these
projects can be incorrect. Whereas within the family gift giving can be seen
as a duty that arises from the nature of filiation, gift giving among friends
and neighbours is voluntary (de L´Estoile 2014: S70). Therefore, gift giving is
perceived as moral and valuable and tends to be reciprocated. A thing is not a
gift itself, it can be identified as a gift only in connection to its obligations
(Mauss 1990). In other words, gift is a gift through relations between giver
and recipient of such a gift. The act of gift giving therefore reflects not only
the value of the gift, but also the value of the action itself supporting rela-
tions among members of the social group (Servet 2009: 88). This relation-
ship, however, always  refers  to hierarchy (Graeber  2001:  29). I  heard  two
women at  the  non-monetary  zone chatting  about  feeling  bad  when they
should take something without giving something else in return, they would
feel like thieves or debtors. This refers to what Gregory (1982: 19) pointed
out 
Gift economy, then, is a debt economy. The aim of a transactor in such an
economy is to acquire as many gift-debtors as he possibly can and not to
maximize profit, as it is in a commodity economy. What a gift transactor desires
is the personal relationships that the exchange of gifts creates, and not the
things themselves. 
The principle of the hierarchy was also one of the main reasons why most
participants of my research refused to compare this project to charity. They
referred to the paternalistic relationships that charity projects establish and
mentioned that charity does not allow people to participate fully in the ac-
tivities and to become an equal partner. 
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One can claim that the non-monetary zone is a kind of free giving which
is not reciprocal. «Once given, the free gift entails no further claims from the
recipient» (Douglas 2002 [1990]: ix). However, despite of receiving nothing in
return, donors are supposed to benefit from a good feeling as the giver of the
gift (Laidlaw 2000: 624). Moreover, for Baudrillard (1993 [1976]: 48-49) the
idea of free gift is a myth since this gift cannot be recognized as a gift so as
not to be reciprocated. The lack of reciprocity then leads to the fact that the
free gift creates no social ties. In other words, free gift makes no social rela-
tionships which are very important in the non-monetary zone. 
Also, other terms, such as “exchange”, “swap” and “barter”, used by partic-
ipants do not fit since they are based on the right to demand something in
return. Though, things provided at non-monetary zone are free of any kind
of demand and obligation. Humphrey and Hugh Jones (1992: 7) stress barter
is determined by the mutual desire of its participants to gain some objects.
However, at  non-monetary  zone one can bring  something without  taking
something  in return. Also, nobody knows in advance  what  things  will  be
available here. The non-monetary zone is not based on a principle “tit for
tat”. 
For the same reason, other kinds of “trade” are also excluded. In connec-
tion with the monetary economy respondents often expressed some degree
of  resistance. Especially  the  organizers  of  non-monetary  zone  accounted
themselves actors distancing from consumerism and ideas of neoliberal capi-
talism although most of them do not label themselves as anarchists. Regard-
ing the impersonal and anonymous character of money, it creates completely
different kind of relationship among persons and supports the anonymity of
transactions which is not welcomed in the non-monetary zone. In addition,
formal trade where money plays a major role is incompatible with the idea of
no-monetary zone. 
During the interviews, some participants also referred to “sharing”. But
can we talk about sharing in case of non-monetary zone? Sharing was men-
tioned by participant without being explained or even understood. They just
talked about it because they saw it on the leaflets promoting the non-mone-
tary zone. If sharing is a term usually tied to a social group, a community
which is interested in sharing, and can be defined as a common use and con-
sumption of resources, what is shared in non-monetary zone? What is the
object of sharing? Following Widlock (2013: 12) «people do share what they
value, they share without receiving or even expecting returns». However, at-
tenders to the non-monetary zone provide things which they want to get rid
of, it means they do not value them. In fact, only a place is shared in the non-
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monetary zone which, however, is also shared by non-visitors as it is orga-
nized in public space. Last but not least, the term sharing does not seem to
be suitable because of for-profit sharing (e.g. sharing of cars and accommo-
dation) which has increased recently. 
It  is  evident  that  an ambivalent conceptualization causes  problems for
spreading  the  idea  of  this  project. Non- monetary  zone  means  different
things to different participants, such as the organizers, the attendants, pub-
lic officials and to me as the ethnographer as well. The lack of this consensus
is further enhanced by the fact that these participants come from different
political or apolitical backgrounds and can understand different terms differ-
ently. At the same time, the formal and informal division itself may be very
problematic as it is a necessary simplification of reality. In the real world,
these two spheres intersect and affect each other so much that they cannot
be separated from one another. It also turns out that we are very limited by
the language we speak and the economic environment we live in. These limi-
tations reflect the way we think about the world and the inability to concep-
tualize otherness, something unusual, informal and/or new. Our language is
determined by  terms connected to and proper  for  neoliberal  economy, or
«the mentality of the market place» (Sahlins 1974: 200). At the same time, we
are often unable to conceptualize exchange without Maussian obligations or
the  right  to  demand  a  counterpart. Moreover, perhaps  the  contemporary
Czech environment (with constant reminding of the Communist past and the
effort to suppress any form of resistance against neoliberal capitalism which
in practice means to pursue any bottom-up projects running without the
need for money and bureaucracy for their realization) is not yet ready for ex-
periments like the non-monetary zone. 
All these factors make it difficult to perceive this experiment as a full-
fledged alternative to the monetary economy and problematize its spreading
among general public. It seems that organizers and regular visitors of the
non-monetary zone can either put up with the closeness and operate as sim-
ilar projects (free shops), or, they can keep resisting against formal rules of
today’s political economic settings. This journey is, however, risky and uncer-
tain. Anyway, probably  only  correct  conceptualization  and/or  the  mutual
willingness to overcome the imaginary line between formal and informal can
fix the problem of mediation of the non-monetary zone and support its suc-
cessful expansion.
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Informality as a strategy to formalize
Finding housing in Bamako, Mali
Dolores KOENIG
American University, Washington, DC
ABSTRACT: Informality can be a gateway to formality. The growing urban population of Ba-
mako believed that peri-urban land not yet deeded offered potential for future ownership.
Village chiefs collaborated with them to allocate plots, sometimes mimicking formal proce-
dures, believing it improved prospects for subsequent legalization. The very prospects of fu-
ture formalization motivated action.
The concept of informality includes various strategies for different pur-
poses. Sometimes, informality is used to escape regulation indefinitely or is
avoided because the costs of formalization are too high or the benefits too
small. This occurred in Latin America and even in Bamako’s center-city infor-
mal neighborhoods. At other times, informality may be a gateway to formal-
ity. Informal means may be used to access goods or resources when formal
access is not possible but is foreseeable. The goal however is eventual for-
malization. This was the case in peri-urban Bamako. Land here was not yet
formally plotted or deeded, but  the growing urban population saw places
they could build their homes. They envisioned a future in which the land
would be formally demarcated and they could get legal titles. 
Formality and informality in African cities
Many have perceived developing country cities, especially informal areas
inside and on the periphery, as spaces of disorder, chaos, ungovernability,
and  poverty  (reviewed  in  Demissie  2007;  Smart  2006:  33).  Others  have
pointed out that informal areas are not necessarily either chaotic or poor. For
example, Kihato (2007: 116) argued that informal areas represent alternative
regimes to govern and regulate activities, and Ndi (2007: 22) suggested that
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they generate a new kind of urbanism, which may include alternative moder-
nities. Whether  informal  urban neighborhoods are considered problem or
potential, informal and formal are presented as fundamentally separate from
one another. The goal of many planners is to transform the seemingly unreg-
ulated informal into the formal, governed by state regulation and subject to
state scrutiny (Roy 2005: 148; Mica 2016: 141). 
Roy and others have questioned whether there is a radical difference be-
tween  formal  and  informal. Hodder  (2016:  117-9)  suggested  that  the  di-
chotomy between informality and formality is ultimately imaginary, because
the processes and rules of formality are shaped and sustained by informal so-
cial relations. Roy (2005: 148) proposed that informality be viewed as a mode
of urbanization, since substantial numbers, sometimes a majority, of resi-
dents of developing country cities live in informal areas. Mica (2016) pro-
posed that formalities and informalities often incorporate the rules of both,
thus are often hybrids. Trans-formality is a type of informality that occurs
when the move toward formality comes from the bottom-up; those involved
may adopt rational-legal approaches (Mica 2016: 148). Although the transi-
tion from informality to formality is by no means universal, the example I
discuss here, urbanization on Bamako’s periphery, is aptly understood as a
kind of trans-formality, where the goal of residents is eventual formalization.
In Bamako’s housing context, informality is indeed a lack: of government
planned roads and lot allocation, of title deeds, of integration into utility-
sponsored water and electricity systems. Its informality reflects a structural
understanding of formality as involving state regulation (Mica 2016). In large
part the informality is due to the inability of the municipal and national gov-
ernments to cope with high growth and provide formal institutions in new
neighborhoods (Vaa 2007). The data here come from short-term fieldwork in
2009 and long-term knowledge of the Bamako real estate market.
Bamako and its periphery
Bamako, Mali’s capital city, has grown substantially over the years, from
about 130,000 in the 1960s to 1.9 million in 2010 and estimated at almost 3
million in 2015 (UN Habitat 2014: 270). As the city has grown, so too have its
residential areas. The formal city within the boundaries of the District of Ba-
mako is no longer sufficient to hold its population; urbanized areas include
neighboring, technically rural, communes on the periphery. The District of
Bamako itself contains a patchwork of formally parcelled lots with title deeds
and what locals call «spontaneous neighborhoods», whose populations have
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grown substantially since independence in 1960. In the District, both formal
deeded and informal spontaneous neighborhoods are densely settled; afford-
able housing is difficult to find. Thus many residents have moved outside the
formal District boundaries. As close-in areas become relatively built up, peo-
ple move even farther out into the periphery. There, they find areas managed
under customary tenure.
Customary tenure as the basis of informality on Bamako’s periphery
Before urbanization, Bamako’s urban periphery was primarily used as agri-
cultural land. Although individuals cultivated their own fields, often in the
family for generations, these were not individually owned. Rather, customary
tenure was conceptualized as village ownership. The village itself had rights
over an area of land, which it considers its land. The village chief, usually a
senior male of the most senior lineage of the village, was the incarnation of
the rights of this collectivity. Traditionally, village chiefs did not act unilater-
ally but with the consultation of elders of other senior lineages. Among the
rights held by the chief was the right to allocate land to newcomers.
People throughout West  Africa, especially in semi-arid zones like Mali,
have  used mobility  as  a  strategy to maintain livelihoods  for  generations.
Crises, such as war or drought, often pushed them to move, but so too did the
search for greater opportunities elsewhere. Village chiefs would allocate set-
tlement rights to newcomers who might invigorate a village economy or pro-
vide better defense in times of war. Thus, villagers generally distinguish an
autochtonous  population,  descendants  of  the  original  settlers,  from  a
«stranger» population, newcomers or those descended from them. I have no
information  on  the  distribution  of  population  between  autochtones  and
strangers on Bamako’s periphery, but it is likely that the city’s opportunities
have attracted a significant number of strangers. Although strangers may of-
ten be economically indistinguishable from autochtones, they have inferior
political rights.
When new residents come to Bamako’s periphery, their goal is to find a
building  lot  on  which  they  can  then  construct  their  own  housing. They
search out those who control access to land, usually the village chiefs. This
system is informal in the sense that it is not a part of the formal legal system.
There are no standard building lots, title deeds, or  defined roads. Nor do
these areas have access to the range of public services, such as water, sewage,
and electricity, expected in urban communities. Schools and health clinics
exist, but are geared to small rural communities.
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The central government has introduced some changes into the system. In
the 1990s, Mali decentralized its government by dividing up the country into
communes composed of multiple villages, with local control by elected com-
mune governments. This change was recognized in Mali’s revised 2000 land
code, slightly modified in 2002. This law recognizes the commune’s rights to
any undeeded (i.e., non-matriculated) land within its borders. The law also
recognizes customary land rights; communes can only gain control over the
non-matriculated land held by rural villages with their agreement and the
payment of compensation. The process of urbanization invokes the potential
role of the commune government to matriculate land by apportioning it into
building lots and offering residents title deeds. To do so, however, it must
first matriculate the land after gaining the consent of those with customary
tenure.
Getting land on the periphery
Many villages’ chiefs have realized that urban growth means that their vil-
lages have little future as agricultural areas. In the past, strangers received
use rights for a symbolic payment of ten kola nuts, but new residents want a
permanent transfer of ownership, where they can build residences. There is
no traditional model for the transfer of land from annual cropping to perma-
nent habitation. Thus, many chiefs, sometimes but not always in conjunction
with elders, have decided that the best option is short-term benefit. They
have begun to negotiate prices with those who would like to settle and build.
Some interviewees noted that prices had increased dramatically, sometimes
10-fold, from the 1980s through 2009. These sales have no formal legal sta-
tus, since village is not and cannot be matriculated; they are informal agree-
ments between customary owners and users.
Even though the land sale is informal at purchase, the hope of newcomers
is for future formalization. Once a village has informally ceded a significant
percentage of its land to individuals, the commune government may decide
to negotiate a final cession of land from the village to the commune. Then,
the commune can carry out a formal matriculation and parcellization and
sell the lots (now carrying the potential for title) to actual or potential resi-
dents. Residents also envisage that  formal parcellization will  bring roads,
water, and better services. Thus, informality here can best be conceptualized
not as an alternative to formal urbanization, but as a step on the path to for-
malization. This suggests trans-formality, the bottom-up effort to move to
formality (Mica 2016).
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During 2009 fieldwork, people did not point to villages in which this trans-
formation had taken place. Instead it was an imaginary that motivated peo-
ple’s actions. When people settled, surveyors, who reflect formal organiza-
tion, were often called upon to mark out plots; sometimes a village under-
took its own parcellization. Villages might also issue a paper marking the
transfer of the lot. People could pay the commune government to stamp this
paper, even though it  was not  a  legal  document. This adoption of  formal
technologies  of  ownership  suggests  the  adoption  of  rational-legal  ap-
proaches (Mica 2016).
Residents establish their ownership by building on their new lots. Resi-
dents hoped that when formal parcellization occurred, they would have the
right to purchase the lots on which they lived. On the other hand, if their
house was in the right of way of a new road or water system, they hoped to
gain the right to buy a replacement lot in the formalized area. Thus, they saw
the existing process as an investment in future stability. They recognized
that they might have to pay three times for their lot: first, to procure land
from the village; second, to get a temporary title when the commune carried
out formal parcellization; and third, to get a title deed, when all conditions,
such as construction of a permanent house according to building standards,
were fulfilled.
Conclusions
The informal process of urbanizing Bamako’s periphery is thus a bottom-
up effort toward a more formal organization. Driven by urbanites who con-
sider that the periphery offers them a chance for stable and affordable home
ownership, it  depends on the cooperation of  village chiefs  and commune
governments who want the economic benefits that formalization, through
sales and eventual titling, can bring. 
There are losers as well. The main losers are existing villagers, who are
forced to move even further out if they want to continue to farm. Intervie-
wees claimed that farmers saw their land sold out from under them by chiefs
and other village elders. Others said that the chiefs, who should act as repre-
sentatives of villages, used the proceeds from sales to benefit themselves and
their supporters rather than the village as a whole. Another loser is the zone
of Bamako itself, where urban sprawl has led to increasing congestion and
pollution. 
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ABSTRACT: With  growing  urbanization,  Southern  governments  often  privilege  large-scale
developments  that  frustrate  urbanites’  livelihood  needs.  In  Baguio,  Philippines  public
marketers  counter  such  top-down  disenfranchisement  by  operationalizing  formal
“advocacy”  and  informal  “everyday”  politics.  That  authorities  negotiate  agreements  to
accept payments for marketers’ infractions, I argue, materializes complex and complicit in-
tersections of formal/informal and legal/illegal practices.
Introduction
Bustling public markets are a hallmark of many Southeast Asian cities1.
Yet  throughout  the  Global  South,  explosive  urban  growth  has  prompted
governments  to  embrace  a  vision  of  modernity  that  favors  large-scale
development  projects  (e.g.,  supermarkets,  shopping  malls)  rather  than
responding to the diversity of urbanites everyday needs. By disenfranchising
these vibrant provisioning sites – venues that planners view as “pre-modern”
remnants of entrepreneurial trade – governments limit residents’ livelihood
and consumption choices. My ongoing research on the redevelopment of the
Baguio  City  Public  Market  in  the  northern  Philippines,  however,
demonstrates  that  despite  the  city’s  urbanization  agenda,  marketers’
advocacy to maintain their long-standing enterprises and the personalized
networks  they  entail  have,  to  date,  secured  their  livelihoods  while
materializing complex intersections of spatial politics and formal/informal
and legal/ illegal practices. 
1. This research has been supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) (2012-2017).
2017 A⎸ NUAC. VOL. 6, N° 2, DICEMBRE 2017: 69-75
70                                                  ALAN SMART, JOSEPHINE SMART, FILIPPO M. ZERILLI (EDS)
This  paper  engages  these  issues  by  investigating  the  mainstream
strategies  and  the  edgy  sideroads  through  which  Baguio’s  public  market
vegetable  retailers  sustain  their  businesses  given  municipal  policies  that
repeatedly  threaten  their  security.  I  argue  that  although  the  municipal
government  agenda  privileges  privatized  and  sanitized  spaces,  marketers
successfully use a range of “advocacy” and “everyday politics” – civil law-
suits,  petitions,  occupying  public  space  –  (Kerkvliet  2009)  to  contest
constraints imposed from above. Marketers create new interstitial economic
spaces  within old ones, for  example, by  consigning produce to ambulant,
often unauthorized, street vendors and by expanding their stores into public
market aisles. By fashioning such in-between or “gray spaces” of commerce
(Yiftachel 2012) and subsequently obtaining “formal” and “legal” permission
to pay rent to do so, highlights that the city, despite its modernist rhetoric, is
complicit in using informality and extralegality as urban organizing logics
when  enabling  these  concessions  is  to  its  advantage. I  thus  suggest  like
Smart  and  Zerilli  (2014:  226, 227, 223)  that  informality  and  extralegality
(“not-yet-legal”)  emerge  as  «a  style  or  set  of  practices» rather  than  as
distinct  sectors  of  the economy and that  their  on-the-ground application
demonstrates  how  urban  organization  is  diversely  shaped  by  local
interpretations of what is formal, informal, legal and illegal2.
Ultimately, Baguio  City  Public  Market  retailers  explain  that  to  sustain
their enterprises they have had to activate available resources across sectors.
In 1995, the Baguio government awarded the market redevelopment contract
to a Manila company, UNIWIDE (Marvil 2017). To challenge this contract’s
anticipated threat to their business autonomy, marketers have launched a
series  of  formal  civil  lawsuits  and  appeals  while  simultaneously
operationalizing  everyday  politics,  both  of  which  continue  to  thwart  the
city’s redevelopment plan.
To situate Baguio’s public market trade, I explore how cities might address
the competing demands of capital accumulation and urbanities’ subsistence
needs. Focusing on the retail  sales of fresh vegetables, I  then explore the
channels though which marketers reinforce their central role in local food
provisioning systems.
Repositioning cityness and informality
Rather than governments imposing an image of “cityness” that privileges
well-off urbanites, Jennifer Robinson (2006: 10) argues for policies to adopt
an “ordinary city” perspective – a “reterritorialisation”– that considers  «the
city “as a whole” […] in all its diversity and complexity». Public market trade,
2. See Smart and Zerilli (2014) for a detailed analysis of “extralegality”.
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rather than indicating activities of underdevelopment, evidence how sellers
use  «proximity  in  economic  interactions  to  cement  relations  of  trust»
between individuals and organizations and thus create a more responsive
and reflexive city (Robinson 2006: 110). As Douglass and Daniere (2009: 1-2)
remind us, in situations of limited infrastructure development such as that in
Baguio (e.g., poor housing and social service provision), the street, public
markets,  and  other  public  or  “life-spaces”  become  crucial  settings  for
inventing ways of being sociable, earning a living, and gaining recognition.
Finding ways of being modern in cities worldwide then is realized, not only
in the formal built environment, but also in flexible private and public spaces
and enacted in personal performative socioeconomic practices. 
That Baguio vegetable marketers have occupied public space to expand
their businesses and subsequently, as noted, secured municipal permission
to do so, illustrates how governments, in effect, have “formalized informal-
ity” (Smart, Smart  2017:  3)  when it  is  to their  advantage (e.g., increased
rental income). Both Baguio marketers and the city have exploited the fuzzy-
ness of any formal/informal and legal/illegal spheres to highlight, as Ananya
Roy (2009) argues, that from the outset informality is inherent in city plan-
ning as planners determine which activities are authorized and which are
not. Supported by relations of trust, Baguio marketers’ «self-made urban spa-
ces,  reclaimed  and  appropriated  sites  […]  created  by  predominantly
marginalized  communities» through legal  and  not-so-legal  means  – thus
provide  «new expressions of the collective realms» that can realize diverse
and inclusive contemporary cities that respond to urbanites’ varied needs
(Hou 2010: 2).
Baguio and its public market
Baguio, an urban center  of  300,000, is  the government, education, and
administration  hub  for  northern  Luzon’s  five  mountain  provinces  and  as
such provides  the  customer base new businesses  seek. As  the  altitude  of
Baguio  and  its  surrounding  area  are  above  1,500  meters,  the  cool
temperatures enable farmers to grow highland temperate-climate vegetables
(e.g., broccoli, cauliflower, carrots, cabbage) that are unique to this region
and thus provision a large part of the country. At the retail level, my focus
here, Baguio consumers obtain upland vegetables as well as lowland produce
(e.g.,  string  beans, squash, eggplant, fresh  greens)  trucked  in  daily  from
neighboring  provinces, at  the  public  market, from  street  vendors, and  in
supermarkets  and  neighborhood  shops.  The  Baguio  City  Public  Market,
however, continues as the mainstay for fresh produce provisioning as the
following case studies demonstrate. 
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Vegetable commodity chains and informality in practice
Patricia Bandoy’s  highland vegetable business, for example, is similar to
that of other vegetable marketers3. Patricia sells what she calls,  «vegetable
sets», namely, vegetables commonly used together in customary dishes. This
sales  tactic  enables  consumers  to purchase, in  one place, the ingredients
they need for specific recipes. After purchasing her vegetables each morning
from  her  sukis (favorite)  wholesalers  in  the  market’s  Hanger  Wholesale
Vegetable Section, Patricia gives her receipts to her porter who then collects
and delivers her goods to her store. Trust anchors the relationships among
porters, retailers, and wholesalers. Patricia pays for her vegetables in cash
but by making periodic installments during the day. When business is slow,
Patricia carries over her interest-free credit to wholesalers to the following
day. When Patricia has to reorder vegetables but is unable to shop personally
she explains, «I trust my suki will pick good quality produce for me and my
porter will promptly deliver it; we understand each other’s situations». 
As public market stalls are small (1.5 x 1.5 meters), marketers looking to
expand their businesses employ innovative tactics that further activate the
elasticity  of  any  formal/informal  and  legal/illegal  spheres.  Patricia,  for
example, extends her store premises into the public market aisle by placing
baskets of produce in front of her stall while her neighbor has constructed
overhead shelving expanding into the  airspace  above  her  store. Although
these actions contravene the Market Code guidelines (City of Baguio 2000-
2001), Patricia and her neighbors have negotiated with the market super-
intendent  to  pay  extra  rent  to  formalize  their  informal  and  extralegal
initiatives (see also Milgram 2013: 85-88).
Further down the row from Patricia’s store, Susan Talango sells lowland
vegetables such as eggplant, fresh greens, and banana hearts. To order her
produce, Susan sends a text to her viahera – wholesaler – the night before the
5 a.m. morning delivery. When the produce arrives, Susan checks her order or
has her porter collect and deliver her purchases. Susan explains that,  «My
porter knows the viaheras with whom I conduct business. He does not need
receipts; he simply visits each  viahera to ask, “What has Susan purchased
today?” Our negotiations are based on mutual respect».
Like Patricia, Susan realizes that a successful business entails developing
good social relationships. Thus, when Susan sources a new vegetable from a
farmer, she often distributes samples to her customers explaining,  «I want
shoppers  to enjoy  themselves  at  my store  and hopefully  make additional
3. All names of people are pseudonyms.
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purchases». While Susan’s gesture offers good formal service, it informally
creates a personalized tie recalling Pine and Gilmore’s (1998) concept of the
“experience economy”. As these authors (1998: 98) note, «commodities are
fungible […] services intangible, but experiences  memorable» (emphasis in
the  original).  By  wrapping  her  commodity  transaction  in  a  singular
experience, Susan fosters participatory interactions that distinguish face-to-
face public market shopping from often-disengaged supermarket encounters.
To  diversify  their  enterprises,  in  effect  working  as  both  retailer  and
wholesaler, Baguio’s upland and lowland vegetable marketers often consign
produce (two to five kilos) to unauthorized itinerant vendors selling in the
market  aisles  and  in  the  surrounding  streets.  By  leveraging  such  gray
business spaces, retailers realize “informality” as situations in which  «the
goods and services transacted are legal, but the ways in which they are trans-
acted are not» (Smart, Smart 2017: 2). Cognizant that such varied vending
practices create the market vibrancy, albeit the messiness, that attracts many
residents and tourists, authorities  compromise their  modernist  agenda by
collecting rent from such informal and extralegal sellers – at least until the
UNIWIDE  case  is  settled.  In  a  provocative  initiative,  moreover,  Baguio’s
largest  supermarket  currently  mounts  weekend  kiosk  displays  of  local
specialty products in the store foyer and aisles in its effort to reproduce the
liveliness of the public market down the street.
Conclusion 
«The  Indian  city» argues  Ananda  Roy  (2009:  81),  «is  made  possible
through the idiom of planning whose key is informality». As Baguio’s public
market  trade  similarly  demonstrates  both  officials  and  retailers
operationalize the elasticity of informality as an urban organizing logic to
achieve  their  respective  ends  –  rental  income  for  the  city  and  viable
livelihoods for marketers. Any «splintering of urbanism» then, «does not take
place  at  the  fissure  between  formality  and  informality» but  «in  fractal
fashion  within the  informalised  production  of  space» (Roy  2009:  82;
emphasis in the original). 
Baguio’s vegetable marketers, however,  cannot assume their trade gains
are secure but  must  continue to advocate for livelihood sustainability. As
John  Cross  (1998:  35)  argues  for  Mexican  street  vendors,  government
toleration  of  illegal  practices,  a  sphere  he  terms  «semi-formality»,  is  a
concession  rather  than  a  right. By  not  altering  the  laws, authorities  can
withdraw  such  semiformal  concessions  when  these  strategies  no  longer
satisfy government interests (see also Smart, Smart 2017: 439). 
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The  nuanced  practices  of  Baguio  marketers  thus  provide  ways  to
understand cities as “multiplex spaces” – sites where “overlapping networks”
of  association,  interaction,  and  fragmentation  can  come  together  to
accommodate urban diversity (Robinson 2006: 172). Facilitating the already-
inherent enmeshing of formal/informal and extralegal sectors thus mitigates
the “economic reductionism” (Robinson 2006: 109)  currently steamrolling
urban life to remake contemporary ordinary cities by and more responsive to
residents’ and governments’ needs. 
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Recursive in/formality
Time and ideology in a distributed monetary system
Sarah MUIR
CUNY, City University of New York
ABSTRACT: I argue that in/formality is not a distinction between two qualities, but rather, a
distinction of relative position achieved through linguistic and nonlinguistic practices of
categorization. Through an analysis of illegal currency trading in Argentina, I  show how
temporal and ideological dynamics shape the semiotic framing of in/formality in any given
context.
As Keith Hart (1973) originally proposed and as the premise of this collec-
tion insists, formality and informality are necessarily intertwined. In what
follows, I approach that intertwining as a semiotic process between two co-
constitutive cultural categories. In taking up that approach, I draw on the
concept  of  “fractal  recursivity” that  Gal  (2000)  and Gal  and Irvine (1995)
have developed to describe categorial distinctions – such as public/private,
inner/outer, friend/foe – that do not refer to any particular thing or set of
things, but that can be projected «onto narrower contexts or broader ones»
as well as onto different «activities, identities, institutions, spaces, and inter-
actions», all of which can, in turn, be recategorized over and over again (Gal
2000: 81). I propose that in/formality is just this sort of distinction: a distinc-
tion not between two qualities that inhere within and define different acts or
domains, but rather a performed distinction of relative position that must be
continually achieved through semiotic practices of framing and categoriza-
tion. I  argue  that  analytic  attention  to  these  linguistic  and  nonlinguistic
practices helps bring into view the often overlooked but crucial roles that
temporal and ideological dynamics play in shaping the articulation of in/for-
mality in any given case.
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To make this argument, I will describe a context where the fractal recur-
sivity of in/formality played out in an especially visible fashion. The context
was Argentina between 2011 and 2015, when currency regulations criminal-
ized the popular practice of saving in U.S. dollars. The regulations were an
attempt to safeguard the nation’s dollar reserves, which had come under in-
creasing pressure due to the coincidence of multiple factors, including Ar-
gentina’s limited access to foreign capital (due to its 2002 sovereign default),
a global slump in commodity prices, high inflation1, and the always pressing
need to service that portion of the foreign debt that had not been defaulted
upon. These circumstances had prompted businesses and individuals alike to
hoard dollars, which had long served as a vehicle for hedging against mone-
tary loss in a national economy famous for economic crises and currency de-
valuations2. As the nation’s reserves diminished rapidly, President Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner faced the prospect of yet another crisis. Despite the
dire situation, the currency restrictions proved highly controversial. Support-
ers of the President defended them as necessary for monetary sovereignty
and economic stability. Her opponents, meanwhile, saw them as a state in-
trusion into the market. With the restrictions, the government did prevent fi-
nancial collapse. However, it did not do so by eradicating the purchase of dol-
lars. Rather, criminalization produced a complex monetary system that fore-
stalled outright crisis, but only at the cost of its own popular legitimacy. That
unstable system was defined by a series of nested in/formal distinctions.
Take the distinction between the “white dollar” (dólar blanco) and “black
dollar” (dólar negro). The former term referred to the peso/dollar exchange
rate declared by the Ministry of  Finance. Because of the currency restric-
tions, that rate was not actionable in practice3. Nonetheless, it declared pur-
ported macroeconomic truths and served as the official basis for wage nego-
tiations and budgetary decisions. By contrast, “black dollar” referred to the
illegal rate at which people purchased dollars with pesos accrued through
widely condemned activities, especially the trafficking of drugs, arms, and
humans. Whereas the white dollar was standardized and publicly known, the
1. A scandal at the national statistics agency (INDEC) during this period makes it impossible
to state confidently the accurate inflation rate.
2. Hoarding techniques varied  from stuffing dollars  under  mattresses  to  Swiss  bank ac-
counts. Physically storing dollar bills is popular because of the government’s history of seiz-
ing  dollar-denominated  banking  accounts  (Muir  2015).  As  for  Swiss  bank  accounts, Ar-
gentina has one of the world’s  highest numbers  per  capita  (Swiss Leaks 2016). See also
D’Avella’s (2014) account of the related practice of storing monetary value in real estate pur-
chases.
3. In principle, there could be exceptions that would allow the purchase of dollars in certain
circumstances. However, the criteria for granting those exceptions were never publicized and
they appear to have been made in extremely limited fashion.
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black dollar was negotiated anew in each transaction, inevitably carried out
in hidden, even dangerous, conditions. As popular terms, then, “white dollar”
and “black dollar” reified, nominalized, and commensurated wildly different
practices of calculation, exchange, and negotiation. The terms framed those
practices as diametrically opposed dollars: one formal, legal, and morally le-
gitimate; the other informal, illegal, and morally illegitimate.
This opposition was complicated by the “blue dollar” (dólar blue)4. The
blue dollar was just as illegal as the black dollar, but people who opposed the
currency restrictions and the President more generally considered it legiti-
mate. The pesos used to buy blue dollars may have been earned legally or il-
legally, but always in a putatively moral (or, at least, amoral) fashion. This
dollar was bought in “caves” (cuevas), spaces tucked away inside legal busi-
nesses, from corner stores to banks. The trade was widespread and tolerated
by government officials  except for periodic, highly publicized crackdowns.
Although individual transactions were hidden from public view, the blue rate
was highly visible, for it was determined by an algorithm that regularly cal-
culated the difference between the stock valuations of  several  companies
traded on the New York City and Buenos Aires exchanges. The result of that
calculation was published continually on a widely consulted website5. Oppo-
sition news organizations proclaimed it on the front page of the daily papers
and news organizations loyal to the President condemned it. And so, the blue
dollar became the topic of constant commentary in face-to-face, mass media,
and social media channels.
Almost without exception, that commentary was structured as a polarized
debate. Those who defended its legitimacy as a necessity, given the currency
restrictions’ purportedly populist  and statist  assault  on market  logics, re-
ferred to it as as “parallel” (paralelo), “free” (libre), or “informal” (informal).
All these terms, along with the practices of publicity and algorithmic calcula-
tion, did a significant amount of stipulative labor, for they projected infor-
mality onto the blue dollar while distinguishing it morally and practically
from both black and white dollars. Supporters of the government’s currency
restrictions, on the other hand, refused those terms, preferring “illegal cur-
rency exchanges” (cambio ilegal), a nominalization that posited a black and
white terrain in which legality, morality, and formality were coterminous and
attempts to skirt monetary regulation amounted to attempts to destabilize a
democratically elected government dedicated to the needs of “the people” (el
pueblo). 
4. My account of the blue dollar is drawn from several news media and academic sources, but
especially from Herzbach 2014 and Sánchez 2013.
5. To  my  knowledge, it  is  not  publicly  known  who  sponsored  the  website  (www.dolar-
blue.blogspot.com).
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There was also a host of other “dollars” (dólares). There was a “gold dollar”
or “tourist dollar” (dólar gold or dólar turista), the rate when one purchased
something abroad in dollars with a peso-denominated Argentine credit card.
There was a “Colonia dollar” (dólar Colonia) the rate for extracting dollar bills
with an Argentine banking card at an ATM in nearby Colonia, Uruguay. The
terms “gold”, “tourist”, and “Colonia” referred to practices that enabled peo-
ple to work around the currency restrictions by paying the white rate plus a
percentage-based fee imposed by the Argentine government. There was also
a “green dollar” (dólar verde), the rate for purchasing dollars illegally from
perambulating vendors who charged a premium on the blue as compensation
for the risks of the street. The green dollar (like the black) was not standard-
ized; rather it was derived on an ad hoc basis from the blue and shaped by
judgments regarding variables such as time of day, location, recent political
developments, and the perceived trustworthiness of the parties involved.
Thus, the gold, Colonia, and green dollars all stood as informal, but in dif-
ferent ways. Despite the regulatory processes that  produced the gold and
Colonia exchange rates, the government never recognized them as such. That
studied refusal of recognition, along with the popular naming of those prac-
tices as “dollars”, framed them, like the blue, as the informal but technically
legal derivations of the formal white dollar. Meanwhile, other practices of
naming and calculating framed the green as the informal derivation of the
relatively formal blue. That the blue dollar could stand as formal with respect
to the green and informal with respect to the white demonstrates nicely the
concept of fractal recursivity that I mentioned at the outset: Across these
dollars, in/formality was not a matter of two distinct, if intertwined, social
spaces or even types of activity. Rather, it was the effect of a continually re-
imposed perspectival frame.
This bewildering array of dollars was not an officially acknowledged sys-
tem of multiple exchange rates, but that’s what it amounted to. We are all –
as consumers and economists, citizens and politicians, academics and poli-
cymakers – accustomed to thinking of money as a unitary vehicle that serves
as store of value, medium of exchange, and unit of account. Here, those and
other  functions  were  priced  differentially  across  a  distributed  system  in
which each “dollar”’s price cited that of the others. The result was the possi-
bility of arbitrage, and all sorts of people – from small business owners to
teachers, from waitresses to lawyers – made small-scale profits (or avoided
small-scale losses) by exploiting the differences amongst the various dollars.
It was this illegal but tolerated arbitrage that allowed the Argentine mone-
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tary system to perform the delicate balancing act required by the conditions
of the period in question. Nonetheless, because of the widespread ideology
that envisions money as a frictionless, unified medium, the practice of arbi-
trage and the distributed monetary system that made it possible were not of-
ficially recognized. And so, another projection of in/formality took place on a
far larger scale. 
Despite the thoroughly polarized debate over the legitimacy of the Presi-
dent and her monetary policy, everyone agreed that the existence of multiple
exchange rates was abnormal. For her supporters, monetary value should de-
termined by the state, and for her detractors, by the market. However, for all
concerned, monetary value should be unitary6. And so, both sides framed the
distributed monetary system as informal. The President’s administration did
so in several ways, most obviously by tolerating and even enabling the dis-
tributed monetary  system but  disavowing it  through periodic  crackdowns
and continual public condemnation. Those opposed to the President framed
it as informal by insisting that it was an unfortunate but necessary way of
working  around  her  alleged  mismanagement. Through  these  practices  of
publicity, policing, and policy-making, people on both sides of the debate (as
well as participants and non-participants in the exchange of non-white dol-
lars) all treated this distributed monetary system as the informal counterpart
to an idealized, nonexistent monetary system in which state and market val-
uations of money were perfectly aligned. In other words, formality figured
here as a spectral and utopian aspiration, from which Argentina fell short.
Here, then, in/formality played out across different scales and social spa-
ces in distinguishing between actors, objects, exchanges, calculations, and
even entire monetary systems. In closing, I would like to propose three im-
plications of this proliferating series of recursive distinctions.
First, in/formality is not necessarily about in/visibility, as we might tend to
assume7. Neither is it about distinguishing between any particular constella-
tion of qualities. Rather, contextually situated actors must work to impose
the distinction convincingly through linguistic and nonlinguistic practices.
In other words, in/formality is best seen as the effect of an ideological strug-
gle over  what  will  be dis/avowed and on what  grounds  the legitimacy of
dis/avowal will be judged.
6. This antinomy between the two grounds of monetary value is not unique to Argentina. In
fact, it is utterly common because, as Hart (1986) argued, monetary value always requires
the authorizing work of both political and economic institutions, which need not articulate
smoothly with one another.
7. The website  of  the Global  Informality  Project  (2017), for  example, describes  informal
practices both as “invisible”.
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Second, the temporality of that struggle is key. In the case presented here,
the  impositions  of  in/formality  were  especially  unstable.  Because  of  the
monetary ideology mentioned above, the distributed monetary system was
framed not simply informal, but as intolerably so. People thus judged it to be
so  dysfunctional  that  collapse  was  inevitable.  That  judgment  in  turn
prompted many people to seek out dollars with heightened zeal, thereby fur-
ther destabilizing the monetary system8. The result was a dialectical rela-
tionship between judgments of legitimacy and mechanisms of price that pro-
duced an ever greater disparity between the white and blue prices. That dis-
parity,  in  turn,  contributed  significantly  to  the  2015  electoral  victory  of
Mauricio Macri, who succeeded President Fernández de Kirchner and imme-
diately made good on his campaign promise to end her currency regulations.
Finally, although the particularities of this case stem from the especially
fraught context of Argentine financial history, it is far from exceptional. In-
deed, the general dynamic may prove quite commonplace, and not only in
the Global South, for the contemporary moment is one in which the perfor-
mative power of monetary policy (Holmes 2013) has come under consider-
able strain, even in the political-economic centers of global finance (Appadu-
rai 2015; Streeck 2016). It remains to be seen how that strain might increas-
ingly compel central bankers to turn to in/formality as a tool of monetary
governance – with potentially momentous repercussions for ideologies not
only of monetary value but also of the relationship between states and mar-
kets.
8. See Muir (2016) for an analysis of this self-destructive dynamic in practices and discourses
of “corruption” in post-crisis Argentina.
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To work or not to work
In/formalization practices in the Italian public sector
Antonio Maria PUSCEDDU
Universitat de Barcelona
ABSTRACT: This piece examines the position of workfare scheme recipients in the municipal
administration of a southern Italian city. Looking at the interplay between different regula-
tory frameworks – from administrative to labour and welfare reforms – in a particular locale,
I emphasize the analytical relevance of the formal-informal linkage in understanding the
production of spheres of informality and negotiation within a bureaucracy.
1. There seems to be some irony in the fact that the concept of “informal
economy” entered the jargon of academics, scholars and policy makers at the
beginning of the 1970s oil crisis and became popular in the long period of
economic  and  political  transformation that  followed. Although crafted  to
make sense of the difference in Third World countries economy – being, un-
der this respect, a truly «Cold War concept» (Hart 2010: 151), it did not take
too long to realize how informality was becoming a «universal feature of the
world economy» (Hart 2006: 22; cf. Ghezzi, Mingione 2004; Portes, Castells,
Benton 1989). 
Rather than focusing on informality as the simple lack of formality, it ap-
peared analytically more useful to focus on the inter-linkages between for-
mality and informality and to analyse a broad range of phenomena through
the lens  of  formal-informal relations. At  a general  and abstract  level, the
concept of informality permits to think the  «unspecified content» which is
built into the  «bureaucratic form» (Hart  2010: 148). At the same time, one
should not forget that a certain degree of formalization is always inherent to
informality. What matters, in any case, is to underscore how formality and
informality are mutually constituted and generated.
In this contribution to the Forum I want to focus on the formal-informal
linkages in the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. More in particular, I want
to address the emergence of particular trends of informalization of labour
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within the Italian public administration, showing how the interactions be-
tween different scales of (de)regulation and the concrete situations of local
administrations  may  favour  the  reproduction of  informal  labour  arrange-
ments. The ethnographic material I will be briefly referring to draws from a
wider ethnography of livelihood practices and grassroots understandings of
the economy1 in a southern Italian city along the Adriatic coastline. Here I
will focus on the position of workfare scheme recipients in the local munici-
pal administration. I believe that addressing in-formalization practices in the
public administration may help raise a number of useful questions concern-
ing the definition and analytical value of the formal-informal relation in the
current historical conjuncture.
2. In the summer of 2016 a union assembly was summoned in the town
hall to discuss a labour stabilization plan. The target of the plan were almost
eighty recipients of the LSU workfare scheme2 – Lavori Socialmente Utili (lit-
erally: socially useful  jobs), who had been waiting for years to be perma-
nently hired by the administration. They were first employed in 1998 in a bi-
ennial project for promoting waste recycling and later distributed in the vari-
ous branches of the municipal administration, where they have been fulfill-
ing a variety of tasks – from administrative work to caretakers, from cleaning
services to maintenance work. However, while doing the same job as “formal”
employees, LSU “workers” were excluded from any labour regulatory frame-
work. Instead of receiving a wage and the relative benefits, they were entitled
to a temporary subsidy from the National Institute of Social Security (INPS),
periodically renewed. The “formal” difference of their position did have sub-
stantial  implications  that  concerned  labour  relations,  lack  of  bargaining
power and full subordination. They were not entitled to any reward – such as
productivity bonuses or performance related pay, which could only be allo-
cated after an informal agreement among employees who were willing to re-
nounce to a share of their own. 
During the assembly the union representatives illustrated the proposal of
the labour stabilization plan elaborated by the human resources executive.
The triennial plan estimated that part of the workers could be hired as A –
the  lowest  rank – and the remaining as  B, according to the financial  re-
1. The research was funded by the European Research Council Advanced Grant “Grassroots
Economics: Meaning, project and practice in the pursuit of livelihood” [GRECO], IDEAS-ERC
FP7, Project Number: 323743.
2. Although the LSU scheme differs in various ways from conventional workfare schemes, it
can be considered a stepping stone in the Italian transition from the classical welfare state
to a workfare model.
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sources and the organizational chart. The plan was welcome with cautious
enthusiasm, since previous expectations and promises of labour stabilization
had been repeatedly frustrated. Discomfort and disappointment, instead, had
come to prevail over time, undermining collective solidarity. During the de-
bate some female “workers” erupted, raising the issue of who were going to
get the A or B rank. The implicit suspicion was that someone could receive a
preferential help thanks to his or her connections in the administrative hier-
archy3. Others reacted by raising the issue of “deservingness”, by remarking
that  «if  you haven’t done anything, what can you expect?» Another com-
plained that she had always kept herself away from internal conspiracies and
for that reason was not even entitled to a writing desk. After the assembly
ended, a worker commented to me that those who didn’t manage to get a
desk were the ones who  «did not want to work». On the contrary, she had
been doing everything she was requested: «It is by doing so that I earned the
desk, because I have shown that I deserve it». 
The deservingness of one’s achieved position – symbolized by the desk –
was often claimed by those workers who committed themselves to learning
and fulfilling all the task they were being assigned. In some cases, their com-
petence and knowledge of administrative work allowed them to hold posi-
tions of responsibility, by actually filling the personnel shortage. This type of
aspiration was mainly cultivated by women, most of whom held a secondary
school diploma, who nonetheless had been doing mainly unpaid housework
before applying to the LSU scheme. Men breadwinners, on the contrary, fo-
cused on saving time to keep an “informal” job to integrate the meagre (near
to) 600 Euros monthly subsidy.
The social and economic background of the city is also important to un-
derstand how the ambiguous status of LSU “workers” is being experienced in
relation to ideas of employment and unemployment, and to the social impli-
cations of  being a  wage-worker  or  a  subsidy  recipient. Similarly  to other
southern cities targeted by large-scale programs of capital-intensive indus-
trialization  in  the  1960s, it  has  been  undergoing  a  process  of  industrial
downsizing and, eventually, gradual deindustrialization, with consequential
reduction of  employment  opportunities. High rates  of  unemployment, far
above the national average, the expansion of tertiary low-income sectors and
unwaged precarious works define the livelihood frameworks for a consistent
segment of the population (cf. Mingione 1988). 
3. Collective expectations were eventually frustrated again few months later, when the newly
elected municipal government announced a revision of the labour stabilization plan, which
reduced to 22 the number of LSU “workers” to be permanently hired.
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3. The informalization of labour in the local municipal administration re-
sulted from the combination of various national regulatory frameworks that
in the 1990s intended to reorganize significant sectors of the economy and
state bureaucracy. First, the shift from welfare to workfare allowed local ad-
ministrations to temporarily resort to the unemployed and redundant work-
ers for the fulfilment of jobs of “public utility”. Second, the reform of the
public administration, according to the principles of the New Public Manage-
ment, began to unfold in the years the LSU scheme was implemented. Em-
ployees and LSU recipients were confronted with the increasing tension be-
tween highly formalized and businesslike representations of public services
and  the  informalization  that  regulate  their  actual  functioning.  Third, in-
creasingly binding budgetary constraints on local administrations and the
consequent reduction of resources available created the condition for resort-
ing to LSU recipients – that is, subsidy receivers – for filling the personnel
shortage.
LSU recipients increased nationwide in the late 1990s, when they reached
the peak figure of almost 170.000 (source: INPS). At the same time a new leg-
islation provided the legal framework to “empty out” the large pool of LSU
workers  by  facilitating  their  placement  in  the  private  (e.g.  granting  tax
breaks)  and  public  sectors.  Nonetheless,  the  expectations  raised  by  the
prospects of achieving a permanent public employment may help us under-
stand the informal logics that workers themselves appeared able to negoti-
ate. These expectations are clearly influenced by the larger social and eco-
nomic environment, where people have to cope with the scarcity of stable
and regular employment opportunities, with the recourse to vertical  rela-
tions to achieve individual  benefits, and where public employment is still
perceived as a relatively safe and stable social and economic position. Many
life stories of LSU recipients, if they could be recalled here, would confirm
how informality and formality are inextricably linked in people’s livelihood
strategies, in their ways of making a living and dealing with the state. 
In conclusion, the brief analysis I have undertaken suggests the analytical
relevance of the formal-informal linkage in approaching how the interplay
between different regulatory frameworks – from administrative to labour and
welfare reforms – unfolds in a particular locale. The concrete implementa-
tion of workfare schemes, more specifically, provides an interesting case for
pointing out how formalization and informalization processes are deeply in-
terlinked in the material and ideological constitution of citizenship in con-
temporary Italian society. The analysis of how workfare recipients negotiate
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their condition and prospect of in/formalization is underpinned by notions
of deservingness and dignity, but also constrained by forms of humiliation
and subordination. It is from this standpoint that, perhaps, the formal-infor-
mal linkage unfolds its analytical potentials by allowing to read also the pop-
ular dialectics of negotiation of state bureaucratic apparatus.
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Informality within government agencies tasked with 
controlling informal economic practices
Alan SMART
University of Calgary
ABSTRACT: The trend to dualism in the study of in/formality means that we usually neglect
informality within government, usually seen as the locus of formality, but in practice usually
relying on informal practices to get things done. This commentary uses archival documents
on colonial Hong Kong to challenge this duality.
At its most basic, informality is not following the formal procedures de-
manded in a specific domain of practice (Smart, Zerilli 2014).  Yet, distin-
guishing between formal and informal ways of doing things has important
consequences, as Max Weber clearly recognized in his work on bureaucracy. I
stress only one of these, how a dualistic account in which government is the
institution which forges and enforces formal regulations to govern economy
and society obscures informality within government itself. Corruption is an
exception, but is characteristically explained away by references to individual
“bad apples”, the inappropriate intrusion of private interests into public con-
cerns, or persistence of “traditional” habits that need to be “modernized”
through rational bureaucracy. Even in its exceptions, recognition of govern-
mental  informality  reinforces  identification  of  formality  with  government
and law. The solution to corruption, then, is to thoroughly impose the rule of
law on government itself.
This kind of symbolic system, where formal and governmental are equated
and seen as the polar opposite of informal and societal (formal:informal /
government:society), not only serves as a “distinction” that elevates govern-
ment above society, but also obscures the inescapable interpenetration of
the informal into the formal and the formal into the informal. The situation
resembles Bruno Latour’s account of “the moderns” who conceived culture
and nature as absolute opposites, making possible rapid development of sci-
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ence, which in turn continually produces hybrids which confuse the bound-
aries between culture and nature. Just as Latour argues that we have “never
been modern”, I would suggest that we have never been formal. The more ef-
fort  that  is  made  into  “purification” through  formalizing  procedures, the
more inevitable it seems to be that informality creeps back in, as a fix for
rigidity and conflicts  between diverse formal regulations. Modernity itself
can be seen as the rise of formality, progressively displacing the personalism
and venial alliances of monarchial courts by rational rules and procedures
that theoretically apply to all citizens. The growth of formality, however, is
not complete and arguably could never be complete, as research into colonial
Hong Kong reveals.
Before the 1970s, bribe-taking was widespread in Hong Kong’s govern-
ment, particularly among street-level officials. They had to deal with a Chi-
nese population distant from a government they had no formal influence
over, including refugees who brought expectations from Republican China
that  dealing with government was best  avoided and if  necessary required
bribes. Many had to break laws to survive, so opportunities for squeezing
squatters, hawkers  and  unlicensed  factory  operators  abounded. Observers
thought the problem emerged because colonial rules «concerning corruption
were incongruent with Chinese “folk norms”; what the law regarded as cor-
rupt, ordinary Chinese people often saw as a normal part of life» (Hampton
2012: 228). The danger of orientalism in corruption discussions pointed out
by Gupta (2012: 81) is visible here, but dubious stereotypes clearly have em-
pirical consequences, legitimating Europeans taking bribes.
Regulation creates opportunities for profits by those with discretion over
control of the activity. Domains where government tolerated illegal practices
were particularly prone to corruption. Unlicensed street vendors «were per-
haps the most vulnerable» (Hampton 2012: 228). The police had «ready op-
portunities» for corruption because they were responsible for issuing licenses
to «massage parlours, dancing schools, public dance halls, billiard room and
money changers» (Jones, Vagg 2007: 358). Corruption syndicates operated
among the police, so that regular payments from illegal gambling establish-
ments, for example, were distributed among officers.
Hong Kong has been seen as the world’s best example of «successful trans-
formation from widespread corruption in the 1960s to clean government in
the 1970s» (Manion 2004: 2). A key element in this success was precise de-
marcation between legal  practices  and illegal  corruption. For  example, to
avoid being punishable as bribery, acceptable gifts to government officials
were limited by value. Administration, at least in Weberian forms, requires
sharp boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable practices.
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It  was  thought  crucial  to  limit  official  discretion  among  officers  that
worked at street level. In 1960, Governor Robert Black wrote that «the exer-
cise of  discretionary power by  junior  officers  is  inevitably open to abuse.
When we begin a revision of the laws ... it is intended to pay particular atten-
tion to those laws which give discretion to junior officers1». Anti-corruption
is often thought to be best achieved through reducing opportunities for cor-
ruption. Setting out clear procedures for how governmental work should be
done reduces discretion. A report of the Advisory Committee on Corruption
stated that a key response to corruption problems was that «licensing proce-
dures have been simplified, accelerated and clarified». Licensing should be
closely examined and reformed because «procedural delays could cause cor-
ruption in some form or other. The Organizational Survey Unit is also contin-
ually seeking ways of improving procedures, forms, etc». Corruption is thus
seen to result from informality of governmental practice, particularly when
government officials are in regular contact with the public.
Discretion by government agents has often been seen as a source of differ-
ential  justice discriminating in favor  of  the majority  or the powerful  and
against minorities and stigmatized groups.  It is also sometimes seen as un-
avoidable if street level bureaucrats are to be able to effectively perform their
jobs. Formalizing rules for state officers does not necessarily end discretion,
but may instead tend to displace it to less regulated fields or practices. The
outcomes of administrative efforts to reduce discretion by street-level bu-
reaucrats vary greatly by the specific nature of the position, and the practical
power of those officials to control information, among other variables.
Ironically, clear  definitions  of  legal  process  may have  detrimental  out-
comes as well as benefits. Turning grey areas into sharp divisions between le-
gal and illegal may foster unscrupulous but mostly legal behaviors of collu-
sion. Precisely formulated procedures can reduce the risks involved in profit-
ing from public office, in ways that are often seen by the public as illicit even
when formally legal. Those with power can cross the line more easily with
less risk. Ending illegal corruption may encourage legal forms of collusion.
Opportunistic rent-seekers may find it easier to skirt closer to legal limits
while still being safely on the legal side when that side is explicitly inscribed.
In such circumstances they can adhere only to the letter of the law, without
concern for its “spirit”. Exact formalization of what counts as corrupt may
make things worse for ordinary people, or anyone who cannot afford lawyers.
Sharp  boundaries  between  legal  and  illegal  may  offer  more  impunity  for
those trying to game the system. The rich and powerful have access to re-
sources that help them manipulate technicalities.
1. Quotes  without citations are  all  from archival  documents  accessed at  the Hong Kong
Public Records Office.
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Even when no formal rules are broken, there are many ways in which gov-
ernment and business can (and do) cooperate in ways seen by many mem-
bers of the public as immoral or illicit. I refer here to forms of collusion that
are technically legal but meet widespread public disapproval. Anger at gov-
ernment has soared in the United States and elsewhere. Yet, interactions me-
diated through what Janine Wedel (2009) calls the «shadow elite» have so
much influence as to make public disapproval usually ineffective.
No  government  can  operate  without  discretion.  Administrators,  like
judges, must operate on the basis of judgements about what is best to do
when there is no obvious choice presenting itself. What is possible, however,
is to move the locus of discretion farther up the bureaucratic hierarchy, as
happened in Hong Kong after 1972. It clearly had many positive outcomes,
reducing the weight of petty extortion on Hong Kong’s people, helping to re-
store a degree of public trust in the colonial government, and creating a rep-
utation for reliable rule of law that helped to make Hong Kong one of the
world’s most important financial centres.
The particular  kinds  of  anti-corruption interventions may have set  the
scene for spectacular corruption scandals at the very top of the government
hierarchy, such as the conviction in 2014 of Rafael Hui, the chief secretary
for administration from 2005 to 2007, the second highest ranking position in
the government, for taking bribes from a property company. His boss, Donald
Tsang, was convicted of misconduct in public office in 2017. My argument is
not  that  stopping  the  petty  corruption at  the  bottom of  the  bureaucracy
pushed it upwards, like squeezing a balloon. Rather it is that the cost/benefit
calculations put in place by anti-corruption meant that if you are going to
take a chance by engaging in corrupt behavior, it better be well worth it, and
the reduction of discretion at the bottom of the ranks means that they do not
usually have such opportunities. However, the more fundamental problem
besetting  contemporary  Hong  Kong  is  not  illegal  corruption  so  much  as
(mostly) legal collusion, which has emerged for a complicated set of reasons
related to the complex post-1997 processes of governance (Fong 2013).
Equating informality with society, and its regulation with government, ob-
scures all of these processes, at best individualizing corrupt acts and empha-
sizing “more of the same” in applying more formality within governmental
procedures. Only by recognizing that governmental informality is pervasive
and deserving of analysis in the same terms as societal informality can we
move forward in understanding both formalization and informalization.
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“Sharing economy” versus “informal sector”
Jakarta’s motorbike taxi industry in turmoil
Mechthild VON VACANO
Freie Universität Berlin
ABSTRACT: Comparing conventional motor bike taxi services in Jakarta (ojek) to their recent
online-based  competitors  (GoJek),  this  paper  contrasts  a  prime  example  of  the  classic
“informal sector” with newly emerging forms of the “sharing economy”. It challenges the
notion  of  “informal  economy” as  an  umbrella  concept  for  such  two  different  business
models.
In cities across the globe the rise of ridesharing apps has challenged, if not
radically altered the taxi industry in recent years. The Indonesian capital is
no exception to this development. However, the largest turmoil in Jakarta’s
transportation system was not created by the advent of any global player, nor
did it occur in the formal taxi industry. It was the advent of GoJek, a home-
grown ridesharing app for two-wheelers, that shook the local motorbike taxi
industry in early 2015. The company’s name plays upon the English verb “to
go” and the local  term for  motor  bike  taxi  (ojek), invoking  just  the  right
amount of innovative globality and local flavour. Soon after, the Malaysian-
based company Grab followed suit and released its own motorbike taxi ser-
vice GrabBike, despite its original focus on the regular ridesharing market in
the region. Several minor companies followed, even Uber joined eventually. It
was, however, the pioneer GoJek that first conquered the market over the
mid-year  2015,  exciting  its  consumers  with  irresistibly  cheap  promotion
schemes. Conventional  ojek drivers soon felt threatened by this rapidly ex-
panding new business model. Banding together in protest, they put up ban-
ners across the city warning online-based ojek drivers to enter “their” territo-
ries; some even resorted to physical violence.
Unlike regular four-wheel taxis, motorbike taxis do not constitute a formal
mode of  public  transportation, but  have always belonged to the informal
transportation sector. The expansion of ridesharing companies into this sec-
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tor  therefore fundamentally differs from the informalisation processes it is
causing in the regular taxi industries. The two competing models of motor
bike taxi services in Jakarta represent different forms of informal employ-
ment, the classical “informal sector” versus the recent “sharing economy”. A
brief comparison of these two models will lead me to question the usefulness
of  “informal  economy” as  an  overarching  concept  for  such different  eco-
nomic operational modes.
Conventional versus application based ojek services
In Jakarta just as anywhere else in Indonesia motorbike taxis serve as a
common means of transportation. Most effectively cutting through the capi-
tal’s  infamous traffic jams,  ojek have become an essential  mode of  public
transportation for many of the 30 million residents of the Jakarta metropoli-
tan area. Legally, though, ojek operate outside the law: Ever since their emer-
gence  in  the  1970s, motorbike  taxis  have  never  gained  legal  status  as  a
means of public transport. This distinguishes them from regular taxis, and
various forms of motorized three-wheelers which are recognized under the
Indonesian law on traffic and land transportation (No 22/2009) as «unsched-
uled public transportation». After early attempts of banishing had failed, ojek
services have been tolerated by local  administration and law enforcement
since decades. Their waiting posts (pangkalan) are highly visible, located on
strategically  important  entry  and  transit  points  throughout  the  city. But
these waiting posts are more than mere physical shelters, they are informal
institutions organising  ojek services and regulating the market by distinct
membership rules and a codex of territory-based coexistence. 
This informal market regulation was disturbed by the advent of companies
offering application-based ojek services. Anyone possessing a motorbike and
proper documents could register as a driver with these companies, while the
new ways of online customer communication undercut the territorial organi-
zation of pangkalan. The hardest blow, however, came from the price dump-
ing initiated by GoJek’s first promotional during the Fasting Month of 2015:
10.000 IDR, roughly 70 European Cent, flat price for any destination within a
25 km radius. A conventional ojek driver would start at 5.000 IDR for a short
distance trip and easily charge 40.000 IDR or more for a 25 km ride. For Go-
Jek drivers these promotional offers were equally lucrative, since the com-
pany compensated the regular fare, then 4.000 IDR per kilometre. The Ra-
madhan offer was the onset of GoJek’s market conquest and the beginning of
a long and fierce price war between the big emerging ridesharing players. Go-
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Jek and GrabBike were soon joined by American ridesharing giant Uber re-
leasing its own Uber Motor service, because the company did not want to
miss out on this highly promising market in the largest economy in South-
east Asia. 
The sudden expansion of an online-based  ojek industry also raised con-
cerns within the formal transportation industry. In late 2015 its representa-
tives demanded the ban of any app-based ojek service, charging the platform
providers with coordination of an illegal form of public transport. Meanwhile
associations of  ojek drivers called for the legalization and regulation of the
motorbike taxi industry. The controversial debate culminated in an official
statement by President Joko Widodo, in which he explicitly proclaimed a tol-
erating stance towards the ojek industry in general, and its application-based
innovation in particular. For the context of Jakarta especially one argument
prevailed: As long as the city’s formal public transport system fails to pro-
vide effective service to its citizens, motorbike taxis and especially the “mod-
ern” app-based ojek services are temporally needed. While the possibility of
full legal recognition resurfaces in ongoing debates, any kind of ojek services
in  the  meantime  remain  somewhere  in  the  spectrum  of  «extralegality»
(Smart, Zerilli 2014): illegal in the strict sense, but officially tolerated - even
explicitly today.
When the “sharing economy” enters the “informal sector”
In analytic terms, conventional and application-based ojek represent two
different poles within the broad range of practices subsumed under the term
“informal economy”. From popular culture to politics:  ojek drivers serve as
emblematic representation of the “informal sector” in its original sense (cf.
Hart 1973). In dealing with ojek, local administrations perpetuate the image
of the “urban poor”: The toleration of ojek services is justified on purely so-
cial grounds, while any policy to support  ojek drivers is framed as “poverty
reduction” measurement. When entering the market, GoJek founder Nadiem
Makarim was certainly wise to strike the same paternalistic tone and frame
his company’s mission in social terms: to empower informal sector workers
by offering ojek drivers a platform to effectively find clientele and reduce un-
productive waiting time. 
The business model of GoJek, Grab or Uber is covered under the common,
though highly debated term ”sharing economy”. More accurately, they repre-
sent the for-profit branch of peer-to-peer online platforms (Schor 2016: 11),
which have lead Arun Sundararajan (2016) to introduce the term «crowd-
based  capitalism».  The  conditions  of  this  crowd-based  capitalism  are  in
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many ways informal, since they undermine employment standards of the for-
mal economy. Yet in comparison to its original offline counterpart, online-
based ojek services have led to some degree of formalization regarding em-
ployment and service, while simultaneously de-regulating the market.
Officially, the online  platforms are  registered as  technology companies
and ‘partner’ with self-employed  ojek drivers. To  register  with  any of  the
companies requires a range of documents, which are sometimes difficult to
produce for those used to working in the informal sector. Registered drivers
are charged a service fee, GoJek for example cuts 20 percent. Company man-
agement determines the rules and fixes the pricing schemes, drivers there-
fore find themselves in a position of dependent self-employment. Reduction
of  fares  and performance bonuses  have repeatedly  led GoJek or  GrabBike
drivers to protest their management. Form a customer’s point of view, online
platforms have formalized  ojek services: Instead of them having to haggle
over fares with drivers, the application would calculate fares in advance. Ad-
ditionally, all major players provide accident insurance for passengers and
drivers. Drivers must comply with company rules and are held accountable
for their service quality by customer feedback on their personal online pro-
file. These shifts towards formalization were accompanied by the de-regula-
tion of the ojek service market. Even though conventional ojek services have
operated  beyond  governmental  control,  they  were  still  regulated  by  the
pangkalan system, based on communal neighbourhood structures and often
connected to informal local authorities. 
Concluding remarks
Can the working conditions of conventional ojek drivers and those of ne-
oliberal crowed-based capitalism thus be grasped by the same analytical con-
cept of “informal economy”? Based on the brief comparison above, I argue
that the structural differences by far overshadow the commonalities, which
are limited to their negative distinction from “formal employment”. The con-
ceptual  expansion of  “informal  economy” from those economic activities,
that exist beyond the scope or will of state intervention, to neoliberal forms
of de-regulation, where the right to free market interaction is guaranteed by
the state, has left the seal of “formal economy” for a (historically) specific,
welfare-oriented state-corporation-market relation. All changes brought by
neoliberalization had to be absorbed conceptually by the informal. We do not
need to regress to the stereotypical understanding of an informal sector, that
stands for the resourceful ways to make a living practiced by the urban poor
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in the Global South. But we need to leave some conceptual space for the “un-
ruly” as opposed to the “de-regulated” and for non-state actors, such as local
communities, as alternative regulative institutions. While at the same time,
it is necessary to update and diversify our understanding of the formal to in-
clude governmental techniques and non-state actors, such as corporate in-
stitutions, as sources of formality.
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ABSTRACT: This paper explores dynamics of formalization and informalization as interlinked
social processes as a contribution to a critical understanding of rule of law capacity building
programs in the framework of  EU enlargement policy. It also challenges the assumption
according to which informality would be a modality characteristic of countries of the “Global
South”.
The  concept  of  “informal  economy”  was  forged  in  the  framework  of
development studies (Hart 1973). While it  has been – and is often still  –
uncritically employed to refer to a distinct, separate “sector” from the formal
economy, it is widely recognized today that informal practices permeate the
formal  economy  (Guha-Khasnobis,  Kanbur,  Ostrom  2007).  A  significant
contribution to a critical assessment of informality as a process linked to
formal practices came from the anthropological scrutiny of the legal/illegal
divide (e.g. Heyman 2013), a pervasive dichotomization recently complicated
by “extralegality”, a broader conceptual framework referring to diverse kind
of social processes in which collective and individual agents and institutions
interact,  favour  and/or  contrast  the  production  of  both,  formality  and
informality in given social contexts (Smart, Zerilli 2014).
Drawing  on  ideas  and  ethnographic  material  developed  while  doing
fieldwork  within  EU-funded  legal  cooperation  projects  –  formerly  in
Romania, and more recently in Kosovo – in this commentary we focus on dia-
lectics  and  tensions  between  formalization  and  informalization  as  inter-
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linked  social processes. We notably explore how dynamics of in/formalization
may serve to penetrate logics and mechanisms of programs and projects of
justice development, and particularly the diffusion of a certain legal culture
under the “rule of law” umbrella concept.
While a number of authors have began to unpack the concept of rule of
law itself, seeing it as a historical, cultural artefact of and for governmental,
domination,  and  other  exploitative  practices  captured  by  the  idea  of
“plunder”  (Mattei,  Nader  2008),  we  suggest  to  look  at  rule  of  law  as  a
commodity exchanged across the global legal marketplace. A market where
legal  knowledge,  expertise  and  consultancy  are  exported  and  imported,
offered, and in fact traded from countries of the “Global North” – aka the
donors, each in competition with each other  –  towards countries  of  the
“Global  South”  – the  beneficiaries  of  international  aid,  struggling  for
recognition – in the form of projects and programs of legal development. The
challenge we take, hence, is to bring current reflections on in/formality as
social process back to (legal) development studies, notably in the framework
of rule of law capacity building programs.
Prishtina,  capital  and  largest  city  of  Kosovo,  Europe’s  youngest  state.
Especially the summer from early in the morning till late evening a plethora
of bars and cafes around the city centre are plenty of people having their
macchiato, a very tasty coffee. Stereotypes about Kosovar Albanians insist on
their laziness. Their ability “to work” in cafes is often object of jokes and self-
ironies. Actually, the tremendous number of  meetings held in cafes  is  an
important aspect of the projects’ social life and indeed  an opportunity to
develop the projects in which “locals” and “internationals” cooperate. From
apparently  innocent, ironic  comments  the  tone  of  the  conversation  may
suddenly  shift  to  serious  observations.  While  discussing  about  the
organization  of  a  seminar  for  a  project,  a  young  official  of  the  Kosovo
Ministry of justice says: «Do they [the internationals] really think they can
just come here in their imperialistic way? They don’t respect my country. They
don’t know anything about us – and they want to tell us, how to make our
country better? No, you cannot bring rule of law like this!» (emphasis added).
Since the end of the Cold War the world-hegemonic legal regime known as
the  rule  of  law  has  increasingly  driven  privatization,  marketization  and
democratization programs, notably across the region interested by the EU
enlargement policy. According to the EU, «the rule of law is the backbone of
any modern constitutional democracy. It is one of the founding principles
stemming  from  the  common  constitutional  traditions  of  all  the  Member
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States of the EU and, as such, one of the main values upon which the Union
is based.  Respect for the rule of  law is  a precondition for EU membership»
(emphasis added)1. But how such precondition is achieved in actual practice,
if  ever?  And  how  respect  for  the  rule  of  law  as  a  precondition  for  EU
membership intersects with the “respect for my country” from the vantage
point of people belonging to beneficiary administrations?
Among  several  other  instruments,  the  EU  adopted  the  Twinning,  an
institutional building tool designed to develop cooperation between public
administrations  of  EU  member  states  and  of  beneficiary  (candidate  or
potentially candidate) countries2.  A considerable part of the EU budget for
enlargement  is  allocated  for  developing  rule  of  law  capacity  building
programs across the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance region (IPA)3.
Drafting a Twinning call for proposal and the application itself are rigidly
formalized  procedures.  The  competition  among  applicant  countries,
however,  is  often  influenced  by  extralegal  practices,  notably  the  unique
political and economic relationships certain member states have established
with IPA region countries. For a member state, “to win” a project means to
get financial resources and the opportunity to exercise a considerable power
influence on the ground, notably on the way the legal system of a beneficiary
country could be shaped, with significant economic consequences including
financial investments, joint ventures and commercial partnerships.
The backbone of Twinning are usually two project leaders – one on behalf
of  the EU member state  leading the project, the  other  of  the  beneficiary
administration – a “Resident Twinning Adviser” (RTA) from a EU member
state and his local counterpart. The RTA is usually assisted by two salaried
“locals”: an assistant and a translator. The general aim of a Twinning is to
provide support for the transposition, implementation and enforcement of
the  EU legislation  (the  EU acquis). Hundred  pages  of  EU-law have  to  be
translated  in  another  language  and  transposed  into  a  national  legal
framework,  finding  the  best  solution  in  structure  and  wording.  In  this
process  of  legal  harmonization  «law  is  not  mathematics»,  as  one  RTA
observes.  In  order  to  transpose  and  translate  a  legal  provision  different
1. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A new
EU  Framework  to  strengthen  the  Rule  of  Law,  available  at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0158R(01) (accessed on 12/11/2017).
2.  See  htps://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/twinning_en  (accessed  on
12/11/2017).
3. The IPA region includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the  former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.
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solutions are possible: «You cannot imagine the fights behind the façade!
Even  within  the  EU,  member  state  countries  are  fighting  for  their own
solution!», the same informant suggests. Interestingly, while disagreements
and controversies are relevant for understanding the actual implementation
of  projects  and  their  final  outcome,  the  conflictual  dimension  does  not
appear in official documents. Divergent opinions regarding how to face an
accident  or  to  address  a  technical  issue  are  average  during  unofficial
meetings, email  exchanges, and cell  phone conversations. Those informal
negotiations, however, perceived as ubiquitous and «quite exhausting!», in
the words of one expert, are carefully removed from the project reports. «It is
a long way to negotiate a report. A considerable amount of time is spent
writing reports in order to find the correct wording», the same expert adds.
Not infrequently, the project leaders in charge of the report are asked by EU
representatives to rewrite this or that section in order to make it consistent
with  the  original  blueprint,  its  structure  and  wording  such  as  “terms  of
reference”, “assumptions”, “local ownership”, and so on. Similarly, under the
current EU audit regime, a work plan has to be implemented, benchmarks
have  to  be  fulfilled,  reports  to  be  written,  documents  to  be  produced,
visibility guarantee, sustainability assured. As Riles (1998) has observed for
similar cases of negotiations of international agreements, matters of  “form”
(i.e. aesthetics) appear more important than questions of “meaning”.
Frequently  glossed  as  “internationals”,  experts  working  for  Twinning
programs  are  experienced  legal  practitioners  from  EU  member  states.
Typically they are legal professionals, judges, prosecutors or academics with
a permanent position in their home country public administration. In our
experience they are often male close to retirement age, who feel flattered by
the  opportunity  to  provide  their  job  with  an  international  dimension:
«working as an expert here [in Kosovo] is a chance to give an international
turn  to  my  career»,  said  one  expert.  In  addition  to  several  benefits,
internationals often show themselves enthusiastic and proud to turn their
knowledge and longstanding legal experience at the service of “developing
democracies”.  Beyond  such  moral  implications,  many  of  them  consider
working  as  a  consultant  in  a  country  like  Kosovo  an adventurous, exotic
experience: «Isn’t our life more interesting and exciting here?», an expert
observes and immediately responds: «Oh, how boring it will be, when back in
my  country  office!».  Obviously,  money  is  another  important  factor:  the
payment due for a mission abroad is usually very convenient comparing to
the salary the same expert would earn in the home country.
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International  experts cooperate with  “locals”, namely officials  and civil
servants of beneficiary public administrations, usually  professionals with a
university background in law. While at least  in principle experts from EU
member  states  and  officials  from  candidate  countries  share  the  same
commitment  (as  prescribed  by  the  Twinning  manual  itself),  their  actual
collaboration  is  challenged  by  their  structurally  unequal  position  in  the
project  in  terms  of  roles,  access  to  the  project’s  budget  and  capacity  to
influence the project’s implementation. In fact, the Twinning does not allow
recruitment of local officials in the role of paid experts. Logics and rhetoric
of  cooperation  and  learning  by  doing  on  which  the  Twinning  is  based
reserves to the locals (and only to some of them) the opportunity to take part
to  seminars  and  “study  visits”,  the  latter  being  educational  initiatives
organized by representatives of the EU member state in their home country
and institutions. These are often also occasions for tourism and leisure, and
are perceived by  locals  as a  source of  revenue in addition to the modest
salary  of  the  beneficiary  public  administration.  As  anticipated,  major
discrepancies  between  locals  and  internationals  concern  their  different
retribution and what they actually “get” from participating in a project. If we
look at the average budget of a Twinning project (typically from € 1.2 to 2.0
million) from an accounting perspective, roughly 80% of the total amount of
the expenses goes for the RTA salary, the short- and long-term experts’ fees.
In other words, as one RTA observes, «the money goes back to EU member
state representatives, instead of reaching the beneficiary country», as one
might expect.
Interestingly,  although  these  structural  inequalities  affect  the  actual
collaboration and the everyday project’s social life, there seems to be a non-
spoken mutual agreement between “locals” and “internationals”. Beyond the
effectiveness  of  the projects  and irrespective of  their  actual  outcomes all
actors involved share the idea that new projects have to be launched and
ongoing  missions  extended.  This  is  cynically  summarised  by  a  local
informant  as  the  common  interest  «to  keep  the  sick  person sick». A full
recovery  of  the  patient  would  not  justify  any  further  aid  intervention  of
assistance reducing a number of opportunities (including salaries for local
staff, benefits for the local economy and infrastructure like hotels, taxis and
restaurants etc.) for many of the actors actively involved in making the rule
of law a commodity to be exchanged and traded across the legal marketplace,
at both local and global level.
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To conclude, ethnography among “internationals” and  “locals” actively
involved in the legal marketplace also shows that assigning to countries of
the  “Global  North” the  role  of  providers  of  legal  rationality  and  formal
procedures for countries in the “Global South”, the latter being presumably
“affected”  by  informal,  traditional,  and  often  corrupt  practices  is  a
misleading  ideological  assumption, albeit  persistent  in  both  popular  and
academic discourse. An insider view of the legal marketplace rather suggests
that  formal  and  informal  practices  and  processes,  their  intricacies  and
uneven  configurations  permeate  the  actual  implementation  of  the
cooperation projects, beyond the local/international divide.
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